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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1975, the courts uniformly refused to permit recovery at
common law for the loss of either an injured child's1 or parent's' society
and companionship, a although legislatures in three states had enacted
2E.g., Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Baker, 161 Ala. 135, 49 So. 755 (1909)
(collecting cases expressly denying recovery for "loss of companionship and association");
Smith v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 171 So. 2d 96 (1965); Jackiewicz v. United Illuminating
Co., 106 Conn. 310, 138 A. 151 (1927); Wilkie v. Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 109 So. 225
(1926); Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323 (1906) (denying recovery for "mental
suffering"); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972); Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery,
Inc., 295 N.Y. 270, 67 N.E.2d 155 (1946); White v. City of New York, 37 App. Div. 2d
603, 322 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1971); Foti v. Quittel, 19 App. Div. 2d 635, 241 N.Y.S.2d 15
(1963); Quinn v. City of Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 521, 90 A. 353 (1914); McGarr v. National
& Providence Worsted Mfills, 24 RI. 461, 53 A. 320 (1902); RESTATEVENT or ToaRS § 703
(1938); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1060 (1953); Annot., 37 A.L.R. 11 (1925). But see Stephens
v. Weigel, 336 M. App. 36, 82 N.E.2d 697 (1948) (verdict awarding damages for "the
loss of the services and society of his wife and daughter" affirmed without discussion);
Bias v. Ausbury, 369 Mich. 378, 120 N.W.2d 233 (1963) (actions by mother and father
for various losses sustained because of injury to son, including "deprivation of the son's
'normal' companionship"; court ordered new trial on issue of damages).
The law in Florida is in a state of confusion. In Wilkie v. Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 109
So. 225 (1926), the court ordered a new trial in an action for the lost services of an
injured ten year old boy on the ground that the $2,500 verdict was excessive and directed
the plaintiff-father to introduce evidence of the services actually rendered by his son.
In Yordon v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 1973), the court stated in dictum that
Wilkie authorized recovery for "the loss of the child's companionship, society, and
services . . . ," and held that either or both parents could sue for such damages.
But, other Florida cases have construed Wilkie to limit the damages recoverable to com-
pensation for lost services. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1956);
City Stores Co. v. Langer, 308 So. 2d 621 (Fla. App. 1975).
2Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Early
v. United States, 474 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1973) (applying law of Alaska); Meredith v.
Scruggs, 244 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'g 134 F. Supp. 868 (D. Hawaii 1955) (applying
law of Hawaii); Turner v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 159 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1958)
(applying law of South Carolina); Hill v. Sibley Mem. Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C.
1952); Jeune v. Del E. Webb Const. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954); Halberg v.
Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 59 A.L.R.2d 445 (1957); Hankins v. Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa
1973); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962); Sabatier v. Travelers Ins.,
184 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 1966) (denying recovery for "mental suffering"); Hayrynen
v. White Pine Copper Co., 9 Mich. App. 452, 157 N.W.2d 502 (1968); Eschenbach v.
Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360,
498 P.2d 366 (1972); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972);
Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc. 2d 1078, 348 N.Y.S.2d. 696 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Gibson v.
Johnston, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 413, 144 N.E.2d 310 (1956); Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 52 Wash.
2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 707A (Tent. Draft
No. 14, 1969); Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 454 (1958).
3"Society and companionship" is a term of art that encompasses the intangible qualities
of the parent-child relationship. For a fuller discussion of the nature of the interest pro-
tected in an action for lost society and companionship, see section 3A infra.
For a discussion of the common law governing the loss of an injured parent's or
child's society and companionship, see H. CrARxn, THE LAw or DoiEsnc RELATIONS 3re
T UNrED STATES § 10.6 (1968) [hereinafter cited as H. C.ARx]; W. PRossER, HAwDBoox
oF rE= LAw OF TORTS § 125 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PRossER; Lewis, Jr.,
Three New Causes of Action? A Study of the Family Relationship, 20 Mo. L. REv. 107
(1955); Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 CoLUM. L. REV.
1341, 1346-47, 1357 n.95 (1961); Note, Consortium . . . Child's Right to Recover for
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statutes permitting a parent to recover for the loss of an injured child's
society and companionship.4 Then, in Shockley v. Prier,5 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the parents of an infant who had been perma-
nently blinded and disfigured could bring an action against the de-
fendant-physicians for the loss of the injured child's aid, comfort, society,
and companionship. The court observed that Wisconsin's wrongful death
statute "already recognizes the loss of society and companionship as an
element of damages in the case of death," 6 and concluded that it seemed
."reasonable to recognize this same type loss where there has been injury
to a minor child."' Two weeks later, in Hair v. County of Monterey,8
an intermediate appellate court in California took the same position by
way of dictum. The court noted the holding in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp.' that both spouses could recover for loss of consortium. It
then expressed its opinion that "no reasonable distinction can be drawn
between the right of parents, in appropriate circumstances, to seek re-
covery for lost comfort, society and companionship of an injured and
Negligent Interference withI Parent-Child Relationship, 4 IND. L. FORUM 552 (1971);
Note, The Child's Claim for Loss of Consortium Damages: A Logical and Sympathetic Ap-
peal, 13 S.D. L. REV. 231 (1975); 54 MiH. L. REv. 1023 (1956); annot., 69 A.L.R.3d
528 (1976); Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 553 (1976).
41owa and Washington have statutes expressly allowing recovery. IowA CODE ANN.
RULE Civ. PRO. 8 (Supp. 1974); WAsir. Rav. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1975). Idaho's
statute, permitting parents to maintain an action for the injury of a minor child and
authorizing the recovery of "such damages . . . as under all the circumstances of the
case may be just," has been construed to allow recovery for the loss of the child's society
and companionship. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 5-310 to -311 (Supp. 1975); Hayward v. Yost,
72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952). Other jurisdictions have statutes comparable to Idaho's,
but have not yet determined whether to construe them to allow recovery for lost society
and companionship. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-11-6 to -7 (1953). See also Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Rivera, 358 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1966) (applying Puerto Rico's general
liability statute, P.R. LAws AzN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968), which has been construed to
allow recovery for mental suffering sustained as a result of injury to either a parent
or a child).
566 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975), overruling Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co.,
188 Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198 (1925). For a discussion of his case, see Comment, Children:
Chattels to Chums-Shockley v. Prior, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 169 (1976).
61d. at 396, 225 N.W.2d. at 499. The Wisconsin wrongful death statute provides:
Judgment for damages for pecuniary injury from wrongful death, and additional
damages not to exceed $5,000 for loss of society and companionship, may be awarded
to the spouse, unemancipated or dependent children, or parents of the deceased.
Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 895.04(4) (Supp. 1974).
71d. at 400, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
845 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975) (hearing denied by California
supreme court on April 24, 1975) (action by parents for the loss of a permanently disabled
child's society and companionship). See also Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp.
1081, 1097 (N.D. Ohio, 1975) (allowing mother to recover $100,000 for the "loss of a
daughter's services and society," without discussion).
912 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). In Rodriguez, the court
was asked to deny the wife's action because other persons having a close relationship to
the one injured (such as a parent or child) might seek to enforce simil claim . The
court responded: "That the law might be urged to move too far ... is an unacceptable
elcuse for not moving at all." Id. at 404, 525 P.2d at 683, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
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totally helpless child and the right of a spouse, in similar circumstances,
to seek recovery for loss of consortium .. . ."'o The court denied re-
covery to the plaintiffs, however, because their son's cause of action did
not come within the class of cases to which Rodriguez applied retro-
actively."1 The plaintiff's petition for a hearing before the California
supreme court was denied.12
1045 Cal. App. 3d 538, 545, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 644 (1975).
1"In Rodriguez, the court held that "for reasons of fairness and sound administration
a spouse will not be permitted to initiate an action for loss of consortium--even though
not barred by the statute of limitations-when the action of the other spouse for the
negligent or intentional injury giving rise to such loss was concluded by settlement or
judgment prior to the effective date of this decision." 12 Cal. 3d at 408, 525 P.2d at 686,
115 Cal. Rptr. at 782. In Hair, the court concluded that this limitation on the retroactive
application of the right of action for loss of consortium was also applicable to an action
for loss of society and companionship, and therefore held that "parents may not maintain
a cause of action for lost comfort, society and companionship of their child if the child's
claim has proceeded to settlement or judgment before the effective date of the decision
in the case of Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp ..... " 45 Cal. App. 3d at 547, 119
Cal. Rptr. at 645. Rodriguez was decided on August 21, 1974, at which time the judgment
in favor of the injured child in Hair had become final. Id.
120n May 22, 1975 (one month after the denial of the petition for hearing in Hair),
the California supreme court denied the plaintiff's petition for hearing in Suter v. Leonard,
45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1975), with Justices Mosk (author of the court's
opinion in Rodriguez) and Sullivan dissenting. In Suter, the court held that the minor
daughter of a woman who had been severely injured in an automobile accident failed
to state a cause of action for the loss of her mother's "society, care, protection, support
and affection." Id. at 745, 120 CaL Rptr. at 11. The Second District Court of Appeal in
Suter made no reference to the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Hair, probably
because Hair was decided on February 25, 1975, while Suter was handed down on March
5, 1975. Since the daughter's cause of action had been joined with her mother's action
for personal injuries, and since the mother's case was still pending trial, Suter came
within the class of cases to which Rodriguez would have applied retroactively according to
Hair. See note nI supra. The court of appeal's decision in Suter thus stands as a categorical
refusal to recognize a child's cause of action for the loss of a parent's society and com-
panionship.
The supreme court's denial of a bearing in both Hair and Suter leaves the law of
California somewhat uncertain. The uncertaintly is compounded by the conflicting doctrines
regarding the precedential impact of a denial of hearing on 1) the supreme court, and 2)
the courts of appeal. The supreme court is not bound by its denial of a hearing in a case
presenting a question of first impression. See People v. Davis, 147 Cal. 346, 350, 81 P. 718,
720 (1905). On occasion, the supreme court has disapproved a prior court of appeals
decision within one or two years of denying a petition for hearing. E.g., Estate of Rattray,
13 Cal. 2d 702, 715-16, 91 P.2d 1042, 1049-50 (1939); People v. Rabe, 202 Cal. 409, 418-19,
261 P. 303, 307 (1927); Bohn v. Bohn, 164 Cal. 532, 537-38, 129 P. 981, 983-84 (1913).
Thus the only definite inference that can be drawn from the supreme court's refusal
to grant a hearing in Hair and Suter is that the court was not yet ready to determine
whether to allow recovery for the loss of an injured parent's or child's society and
companionship.
. Until the supreme court decides this question, what law will be applied by the lower
courts? The courts of appeal are bound by the decision of another intermediate appellate
court in a case of first impression once a petition for hearing has been denied, according to
Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 351, 289 P.2d 450, 453 (1955), overruled on other grounds by
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). For citations to
numerous cases that have complied with the Cole v. Rush directive, see 6 B. Wrrxm,
CALIrORNuIA PROCEDURE PART I, § 669, at 4582-83 (2d ed. 1971). Thus two options are
open to lower courts that adhere to the Cole v. Rush directive. They can look at the
1976]
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These two cases suggest that the time has come to question the
common law rule. Why should the courts deny recovery for the partial
loss of the ability of parents and children to function in a normal,
mutually supportive relationship with each other? Have the courts re-
fused to compensate this loss because it is an intangible one? If so, what
distinguishes this loss from other intangible losses for which tort dam-
ages are recoverable? Given the fundamental importance of the parent-
child relationship, what justification can be advanced for failing to accord
it the same type of legal protection that the marital relationship receives
through the action for loss of consortium? Similarly, once the legisla-
ture has authorized the recovery of wrongful death damages for a
result in both Hair and suter and refuse to recognize any action for lost society and
companionship in California. Or they can distinguish the two cases on the ground that
Hair was an action brought by parents, whereas Suter was an action brought by a
child. Although this distinction may be both illogical and constitutionally suspect, it
is currently recognized in at least two jurisdictions. Compare IowA CODE ANN. Rule Civ.
Pro. 8 (Supp. 1974) (allowing recovery by parent) with Hankins v. Derby, 211 N.W.2d
581 (Iowa 1973) (denying recovery by child); compare WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010
(Supp. 1975) (allowing recovery by parent) with Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wash. 2d
103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958) (denying recovery by child). Should the California courts of
appeal decide to draw such a distinction, Suter will require them to deny recovery
in an action brought by a child. But in a parent's suit, they will be able to limit Hair
to its holding that a cause of action for the loss of a child's society and companionship
is barred if the child's claim for personal injuries has proceeded to settlement or judgment
prior to the effective date of the decision in Rodriguez. They will then have to resolve
the question of whether California should recognize a cause of action for the loss of
an injured child's society and companionship.
If the courts of appeal do not follow the Cole v. Rush directive, they will be free to
allow or disallow recovery, except for the First and Second District Courts of Appeal,
which can be expected to follow their own decisions in Hair and Suter, respectively. Garza
v. Kantor, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1976) (Division 3 of the Second
District Court of Appeals followed the decision of Division 2 in Suter). Baxter v. Superior
court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 519, 129 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1976) (Division 2 of the Second District
Court of Appeals). But see Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Calif., 55 Cal. App. 3d
573, 586, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 729 (1976) (Division 1 of the Second District allowed plaintiff-
foster parents to amend cause of action for lost society and companionship "to one legally
sufficient under the standards of Hair"). There is precedent for a court of appeal refusing
to be bound by the supreme court's denial of a petition for hearing. E.g., People v. Rabe, 202
Cal. 409, 418-19, 261 P. 303, 307 (1927) (quoting from the lower appellate court's opinion,
which refused to follow a prior decision in which the supreme court had denied a petition
for hearing). See generally 6 B. WrrKxt, CALIrORNIA PROCEDURE PART I § 670 (2d ed. 1971).
The supreme court has never expressly reprimanded a court of appeal for refusing to comply
with the Cole v. Rush directive, although recently it has had at least one excellent oppor-
tunity to do so. People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3rd 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528
(1975), vacating 118 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. App. 1975). Perhaps the court's tolerance can be
explained in part by the fact that one of the bases for granting a petition for hearing is
"to secure uniformity of decision." Cal. Rules of Court 29. Rigid adherence to Cole v. Rush
would preclude the development of a "conflict" among the districts over a question of first
impression unless the conflict arose prior to the first appeal of the question to the supreme
court.
As this article was going to press, the California supreme court granted hearing in
two cases that denied recovery for loss of a parent's or child's society and companionship.
Baxter v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 519, 129 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1976) (hearing granted
July 19, 1976) (action by parent); Borer v. American Air Lines, 2 Civ. 47568 (Cal. App.
1976) (hearing granted July 19, 1976) (action by child).
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tortious interference with the intangible qualities of the parent-child
relationship, what justification can be advanced for refusing to recog-
nize an action for lost society and companionship?
The first part of this article will discuss whether an action for lost
society and companionship should be recognized. It will evaluate the
conceptual and policy considerations that have been advanced in support
of the common law rule. It will also explore the question of whether
it is a denial of equal protection to allow recovery for intangible losses
in wrongful death or loss of consortium actions, but not in actions for
lost society and companionship. The second part of this article will
discuss some of the issues that will arise if an action for the loss of an
injured parent's or child's society and companionship is recognized by
the courts.
II. SHOULD AN ACTION FOR LOST SOCIETY AND COMPANIONSHIP
BE RECOGNIZED?
A. Historical, Conceptual, and Policy Considerations
1. Absence of Precedent
Virtually every court denying compensation for lost society and
companionship has premised its decision at least in part on an absence
of judicial precedent.13 However, this rationale will no longer suffice,
now that the Wisconsin supreme court has furnished persuasive authority
for such an action. Moreover, lack of precedent alone is not an ap-
propriate rationale for denying recovery, since the common law is not
static, but evolving. 5 Any court that is concerned about the lack of
direct precedent should simply examine the array of analogous prece-
dents for compensating lost society and companionship.
The cases and statutes allowing recovery of nonpecuniary losses
for other indirect interferences' 6 with the family relationship form the
first cluster of analogous precedents. The closest is loss of consortium '
'
3 See cases cited notes 1 & 2 supra.
1 4 Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
15E.g., Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 389-404, 525 P.2d 669,
673-79, .15 Cal. Rptr. 765, 769-75 (1974).
'
6Throughout this article, a distinction will be drawn between direct and indirect
interferences with relational interests. A direct interference is an act by the defendant
with intent to disrupt a relationship (e.g., abduction, criminal conversation, seduction,
alienation of affections). An indirect interference is an act by the defendant intentionally
or negligently causing injury or death to one party to a relationship, and thereby dis-
rupting the relationship, even though it was not designed to do so (e.g., loss of society
and companionship, loss of consortium, wrongful death). An indirect interference may
also be caused by conduct subjecting the defendant to strict liability or products liability.
See Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
17Loss of consortium is the loss of an injured spouse's services, sexual relations,
society, and companionship. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 125, at 889-90.
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-an action for an injury-produced, indirect interference with the marital
relationship. In almost all jurisdictions, married men are allowed to
recover for the loss of a wife's consortium.1 8 Since 1950,'9 36 jurisdic-
tions"0 have also recognized the right of married women to sue for the
"sentimental elements" of consortium. 2' Despite the apparent similarity
between the actions for lost consortium and lost society and companion-
ship, many courts have rejected the analogy on the ground that a loss
of the intangible aspects of the marital relationship is more worthy of
compensation than a loss of the intangible aspects of the parent-child
relationship. 22  Presumably, these courts have focused on the marital
18 H. CLARi, supra note 3, at § 10.5; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAIES, JR., TBn LAW OF TORTS
§ 8.9 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 1 F. HARPER & F. J~ms]; W. Prosser, supra note 3,
at § 125; RESTATEmMNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 693 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969); Annot, 21
A.L.R. 1517 (1922); Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1156 (1941). Contra, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-205
(1974); Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 (1911); Helmstetler v. Duke
Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
1 9 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950),
overruled on other grounds, Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 914 (1957).2 0CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-209 (1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 167-A
(Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-3-1 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-a (1968);
OKA. STAT. ANN. tit 32, §15 (1973); ORE. REv. STAT. § 108.010 (1974); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 10-2593 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 25-109 (Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 48-3-19a (Supp. 1975); Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1958) (forecasting
Nebraska law); Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961)
(forecasting Montana law); Swartz v. United States Steel Constr. Co., 293 Ala. 439, 304
So. 2d 881 (1974); Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alas. 1974); City of Glendale
v. Bradshaw, 108 Ariz. 582, 503 P.2d 803 (1972); Missouri Pacific Transp. Co. v.
Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12
Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974); Stenta v. Leblang, 55 Del.
181, 185 A.2d 759 (1962); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971); Brown v. Georgia-
Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Nichols v. Sonneman,
91 Idaho 199, 418 P.2d 562 (1966); Dini v. Naditch, 20 III. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960);
Troue v. Marker, 253 Ind. 284, 252 N.E.2d 800 (1969); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272,
78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); Deems v. Western
Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass.
153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227
(1960); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969); Novak
v. Kansa City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); General Elec. Co. v. Bush,
88 Nev. 354, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Am., 46 N.J. 82,
215 A.2d 1 (1965); Millington v. Southeastern Elev. Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897,
293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968); Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio St.
2d 65, 258 N.E.2d 230 (1970); Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974);
Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W. 2d 669 (1959); Moran v. Quality Alum. Casting
Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967); RESTATaENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 695
(Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969); Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 900 (1971). Hawaii, Louisiana, and
North Dakota have not taken a position on the issue. The remaining jurisdictions deny
recovery. Note, The Wife's Right to Consortium, 14 WASHrBuRN L.J. 309, 310-11 (1975).
2 1Women are not allowed to sue for the loss of a husband's services for the reasons
discussed in section I.A.2. infra.
2 2 Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471 '(D.C. Cir. 1958); Smith
v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 171 So. 2d 96 (1965); Garza v. Kantor, 54 Cal. App. 3d
1025, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1976); Hayrynen v. White Pine Copper Co., 9 Mich. App. 452,
157 N.W.2d 502 (1968); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972);
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relationship as a source of sexual satisfaction. However, if one views
the marital relationship from a broader perspective, the analogy be-
tween the two actions becomes more persuasive. It then becomes pos-
sible to characterize both actions as compensating for the loss of
familial society and companionship."
The wrongful death statutes of several jurisdictions provide an-
other analogy for compensating intangible losses caused by an indirect
interference with the family relationship. While many states still limit
wrongful death damages to pecuniary losses, 24 there has been a recent
trend to allow recovery for nonpecuniary losses as well.25 In the parent-
child context, some courts have given the term "pecuniary loss" a liberal
construction, thereby allowing partial recovery of intangible losses.28
Some legislatures have enacted (or amended) wrongful death statutes
to abolish the pecuniary loss limitation altogether by expressly allowing
Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972); Quinn v. City of
Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 521, 90 A. 353 (1914); Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wash.
2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958). Furthermore, a few courts recognizing a wife's action for loss
of consortium have expressed concern that they will be asked to extend a comparable cause
of action to children. See, e.g., Swartz v. United States Steel Constr. Co., 293 Ala. 439,
304 So. 2d 881, 887 (1974); Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 114, 231
A.2d 514, 525 (1967); Diaz v. Eli Lilly Co., 364 Mass. 153, 165, 302 N.E.2d 555, 563
(1973); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 511, 170 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1969);
Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539, 546 (Mo. 1963).
23 Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975).
2 4 The first wrongful death statute, the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c.
93 (popularly known as Lord Campbell's Act), was construed to allow recovery solely for
pecuniary losses. Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 41-42 (Q.B. 1852). For a complete
listing of the jurisdictions that still limit damages to pecuniary losses, see S. SPEaSER, REcovERY
FOR WRONGPU DEATH, § 3.1, at 104-09 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as S. SpaSER].
2 5For a complete listing of the jurisdictions that allow recovery for nonpecuniary
losses, see S. SPEIsER, supra note 24, at § 3.1, at 113-15; Annot., 74 A.L.R. 11 (1931).
For a discussion of the measure of damages recoverable in a wrongful death action by
a parent or a child, see 2 F. HARPE & F. JAwEs, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.14 (1956)
(Supp. 1968); W. PRossER, supra note 3, at § 27; S. SPEISER, supra note 24, at §§ 4.17-.40.
For a discussion of the measure of damages recoverable in an action by a parent, see Decof,
Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death of Children, 47 NoTRE DA=e LAW 197 (1971);
Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, The Death of Children: A Nonparametric Statistical Analysis
of Compensation for Anguish, 74 CoLum. L. REv. 885 (1974); Johnson, Wrongful Death
and Intellectual Dishonesty, 16 S.D. L. REv. 36 (1971); Comment, Damages for Wrongful
Death of Children, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 538 (1955); Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967);
Annot, 14 A.L.R.2d 485 (1950); Annot., 14 AJL.R.2d 550 (1950).2 6Courts at times indirectly compensate nonpecuniary losses by refusing to set aside
verdicts for parents, even though the jury must have failed to subtract the cost of raising
a child from the value of the child's lost services. See, e.g., Ferguson, Damages for the
Death of a Minor Child Under the Texas Wrongful Death Act, 4 ST. MAR-'s L.J. 157
(1972); Comment, Damages for Wrongful Death of Children, 22 U. CH. L. REv. 538
(1955). Some courts have expanded the term "pecuniary loss" to encompass the loss
of the parent's training and guidance. See, e.g., Hoppe v. Peterson, 196 Minn. 538, 265 N.W.
338 (1936); S. SPEISER, supra note 24, at § 4.18. A few courts even permit recovery of
the "pecuniary value" of a parent's or child's society and companionship. See, e.g., Fuentes
v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d 1, 187 P.2d 752 (1947); S. SPEISER, supra note 24, at § 3.49, at
318-20 & n.3.
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recovery for lost society and companionship"7 or mental anguish, grief,
and sorrow.28 More recently, several courts have abolished the pecuniary
loss limitation by a liberal construction of a vaguely worded statute.2
9
The trend in 30 jurisdictions to allow the recovery of nonpecuniary
losses in wrongful death actions sharply contrasts with the rule deny-
ing recovery for such losses when a physical injury interferes with the
parent-child relationship.
The other cluster of analogous precedents is found in cases and
statutes allowing recovery of nonpecuniary losses for a direct inter-
ference" with the family relationship. Husbands and wives can recover
damages for such losses in actions for abduction,"L criminal conversa-
tion, 2 and alienation of affections;"8 parents can recoup intangible
27ALAsxA STAT. § 90.55.580 (1973) ("loss of consortium; loss of prospective training
and education"); FLA. SrAT. ANN. J 768.21(3) (Supp. 1975) (minor children may recover
for lost parental companionship); HAWAnI REv. LAws § 663-3 (Supp. 1974); IOWA CODE
ANN. RULE Crv. PRo. 8 (Supp. 1974) (action by parent for loss of child's society and
companionship); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-1904 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANNf. § 411.135 (1972)
(parents may recover for loss of affection and companionship of child during its minority);
ME. REV. STAT. ANNq. tit. 18, § 2552 (Supp. 1974) (action by parent for loss of child's
society and companionship); Mn. ANN. CODE, Courts & Judicial Proceedings § 3-904
(1974) (action by parent for loss of child's society, companionship, comfort); MASS. Gm.
LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1975); McH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922 (Supp. 1975); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (1974); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-636.1 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §4.24.010 (Supp. 1975) (action by
parent for loss of love and companionship of child and for injury to or destruction of
parent-child relationship); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-1066 (Supp. 1975).28 ARx. STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (3) (4) (1975) (parents
and minor children may recover for mental pain and suffering); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE, Courts & Judicial Proceedings § 3-904 (1974) (action by parent
for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636.1 (Supp. 1974).
2 9 Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407 P.2d 917 (1965); Anderson v. Great Northern Ry.,
15 Idaho 513, 99 P. 91 (1908); American Car Loading Corp. v. Gary Trust & Savings
Bank, 216 Ind. 649, 25 N.E.2d 777 (1940); Lewis v. State, 176 So. 2d 718 (La. App.
1965); St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Moore, 101 Miss. 768, 58 So. 471 (1912); Wyant v.
Dunn, 140 Mont. 181, 368 P.2d 917 (1962); Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207
N.W.2d 686 (1973); Porter v. Funkhouser, 79 Nev. 273, 382 P.2d 216 (1963); Orta v.
Puerto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 36 P.R.R. 668 (1927); Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C.
316, 188 S.E.2d 470 (1972); Van Cleave v. Lynch, 101 Utah 149, 166 P.2d 244 (1946);
Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wash. 2d 91, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971) (parents can recover for grief
and mental anguish); Bower v. Brannon, 141 W. Va. 435, 90 S.E.2d 342 (1955); Kelley
v. Ohio River R.R., 58 W. Va. 216, 52 S.E. 520 (1906). See also Sea Land Services v.
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974) (allowing recovery for loss of society in common law
wrongful death action under federal maritime law).
SOFor a definition of the term "direct interference," see note 16 supra.
31W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 124, at 874-75; RESTATEMENT (Second) oF TORTS
§ 684 (Tent Draft No. 14, 1969).
82H. CIA IK, supra note 3, at § 10.3; 1 F. HARPa & F. JAaES, supra note 18, at § 8.3;
W. PaossEa, supra note 3, at § 124; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 685, 690 (1938); Annot.,
68 A.L.R. 560 (1930); Annot., 28 A.L.R. 327 (1924); Annot., 4 A.L.R. 569 (1919).38 H. CLARK, supra note 3, at § 10.2; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAxsMS, supra note 18, at § 8.3;
W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 124; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 683, 690 (1938). An
action for criminal conversation is an action for adultery; an action for alienation of
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losses in suits for abduction, seduction, and enticement;34 and children
have the right in three jurisdictions to sue for alienation of a parent's
affections."5 It has been suggested, however, that damages for non-
pecuniary losses should be limited to actions for a direct interference
with the family relationship because defendants who directly interfere
act deliberately to destroy the family relationship, while defendants who
indirectly interfere merely cause physical injury to a person who happens
to be a family member. 6 Yet, as noted above, courts do allow recovery
of nonpecuniary losses for some indirect interferences with the family
relationship. Moreover, if compensation is the principal function of
tort law, the manner in which a nonpecuniary loss is caused ought not
to be decisive in determining whether it is actionable. 8
2. Master-Servant Analogy
Some courts have denied recovery for lost society and companion-
ship on the ground that the parent-child relationship is comparable to
the master-servant relationship and, therefore, only pecuniary damages
should be awarded for an indirect interference with it.39 Historically,
there may be some justification for this theory.40 Recovery for tortious
interference with a relational interest was first allowed in actions by
masters. Given the economic nature of the master-servant relationship,
affections is a broader action for any direct interference with the marital relationship.
Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections, 82 U. PA. L. Ryv. 472, 473-74 (1934).
"Heart balm" legislation abolishing the actions for criminal conversation and alienation
of affections has been enacted in approximately 15 jurisdictions for the purpose of
eliminating opportunities for blackmail. H. C.ARKi, supra note 3; at § 10.2, at 267 nM48-51;
AnnoL, 167 A.L.R. 235 (1947); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 617 (1945).
84For a description of the law governing direct interferences with the parent-child
relationship in the United States today, see H. CLARE, supra note 3, at § 10.4; 1 F. HARPER
& F. JASSES, supra note 18, at §§ 8.5-8.7; W. PRoSSER, supra note 3, at § 124, at 882-88;
RFSTATEmNT op ToRTS §§ 700-01 (1938). In some jurisdictions with "heart balm" legisla-
tion, the courts have refused to allow recovery for enticement. See, e.g., McGrady v.
Rosenbaum, 62 Misc. 2d 182, 308 N.Y.S.2d 181, aff'd 37 App. Div. 2d 917, 324 N.Y.S. d 876
(1970).
3 5Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill App.
598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949);
Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 931, §3(b) (1974). Most jurisdictions deny recovery, however.
RESTATEMNT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 702A (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969); Annot, 60 A.L.R.3d
931, §3(a) (1974).
36See H. CLARK, supra note 3 at 277-78.
3 7See text accompanying notes 16-29 supra.
3
sSee H. CLARE, supra note 3, at 277-78.
89 See cases cited notes 1-2 supra.
4OFor other discussions of the historical development of actions for a tortious inter-
ference with relational interests, see Foster, Jr., Relational Interests of the Family, 1962
U. ILL. L.F. 493; Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rlv. 460 (1934); Pound,
Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Mcir. L. REV. 177 (1916).
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compensation was limited to pecuniary damages for lost services.4 '
When the courts later imposed liability for tortious interference with
family relationships, recognition of the right to recover was premised
in large part on the master-servant analogy.42 Paradoxically, however,
husbands were allowed to recover for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary
losses, 43 while parents (like masters) were restricted to damages for
lost services,44 and married women45 and children48 (like servants) had no
standing to sue.
4 7
The courts first departed from the master-servant analogy in an
action for an indirect interference with a relational interest 48 in 1950,
when it was held that a married woman could recover for l6ss of con-
sortium, despite her inability to prove that she had sustained a loss of
her husband's services.4 ' A majority of jurisdictions now adhere to
41By the end of the eighteenth century, a master could recover damages for lost
services from a third person who abducted or beat his servant or persuaded his servant
to leave him. Brett, Consortium and Servitium: A History and Some Proposals, 29 AusT.
L.J. 321, 322-25, 389, 492 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Brett].
42For an excellent comparison of the historical development of the actions for
interference with the master-servant and husband-wife relationships, see Brett, supra note
41. For a discussion of the historical development of actions for interference with the
parent-child relationship, see J. FLEMING, TaE LAv OF TORTS 574 (4th ed. 1971); J.
SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 501-06 (14th ed. 1965); P. WINFIELD, TORTS 527-29 (8th ed.
1967).
43E.g., Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 402 (K.B. 1619) (awarding damages for loss
of injured wife's "company and aid"); Guy v. Livesey, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (K.B. 1618)
(awarding damages for loss of injured wife's "company"). RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 693 Comment e (Tent. Draft. No. 14, 1969).
44See Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930) (summarizing common law).
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 703, Comment h (1938).
45E.g., Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1952] A.C. 716 (refusing to depart from common
law rule that married women may not recover for loss of consortium). RESTATEmENT OF
TORTS § 695 (1938). Married women, of course, had no procedural standing to sue
prior to the enactment of the Married Women's Property Acts in England and the United
States during the last half of the nineteenth century. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at § 7.2.
4 0J. FLEMING, Taa LAW oF TORTS 575, 579, 582-87 (4th ed. 1971); J. SALMoND, LAw
OF TORTS 501-02, 756-63 (14th ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 707A
(Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969).
47Tbe following passage from Blackstone is the classic explanation for the inability
of servants, wives and children to sue:
We may observe that, in these relative injuries [i.e., injuries to the master-
servant, husband-wife and parent-child relationships], notice is only taken of the
wrong done to the superior of the parties related, by the breach and dissolution
of either the relation itself, or at least the advantage accruing therefrom; while
the loss of the inferior by such injuries is totally unregarded. One reason for
which may be this: that the inferior hath no kind of property in the company,
care, or assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of
the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury.
3 V. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 142-43 (1768).
48Prior to 1950, married women had been allowed to sue for direct interferences
with the marital relationship. See notes 31-33 supra.
49See cases cited note 19 supra.
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this position. ° Today, the question is whether the courts should also
reject the master-servant analogy in the parent-child context. 1 Several
changes in the law governing the parent-child relationship suggest that
such a reform is long overdue.52 For example, although child labor
may once have been an important economic asset to parents, compulsory
education,"3 child labor laws,54 and the lowering of the age of ma-
jority"5 have all diminished the value of a child's services.56 From the
child's perspective, the enactment of child support legislation57 has
given minors a legally enforceable right to support, if not to parental
services. The upshot of these developments is that "[s]ociety and com-
panionship between parents and their children are closer to our present
day family ideal than the right of the parents to the 'earning capacity
during minority,' which once seemed so important when the common
law was originally established."5 8  Accordingly, the master-servant
analogy ought to be abandoned and tort law should begin to protect
the interest in society and companionship that is the very essence of
family life.
3. Compensation for Expectation Interest
A few courts have taken the position that since parents and children
have a moral, but not a legal, obligation to give each other society and
companionship, third-party tortfeasors are not subject to liability for
diminishing their capacity to accord each other the intangible benefits
of family life.5" However, the absence of a legally enforceable obligation
oSee statutes and cases cited note 20 supra.5WIt should be noted that some courts have already rejected the master-servant
analogy in actions for a direct interference with the parent-child relationship. See notes
34-35 supra.
52See generally H. FosTm, A "BIL or RIGHTs" ron C ILDRE (1974); T E YouNGmS
MInoRYTY (S. Katz ed. 1974).
53H. CLA~x, supra note 3, at § 8.1(m), at 234.
UH. CLAnx, supra note 3, at § 8.1(k), at 234.
5 5Katz, Schroeder & Sidman, Emandpating our Children-Coming of Legal Age in
America, 7 F A. L. Q. 211, 213 n.16 (1973) (collects statutes lowering age of majority).
5 6 The law still holds that the child's earnings are the property of the parent. H. CLARK,
supra note 3, at § 8.1(k), at 234. For an argument that the common law rule should
be abrogated, see H. Fos=en, A "BiLL or RIGHTs" rOR CHa-DREN 47-48 (1974).
57E. CLARK, supra note 3, at § 6.7. Although a child's right to support under such
legislation is generally enforced by the state, on occasion a child has been allowed to
bring an action directly against the parent. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67,
20 S.E.2d 237 (1942).
5SShockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 401, 225 N.W.2d 495, 499 (1975).
59 B.g., Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 159, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 840 (Sup. Ct. 1974). See also
Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E.2d 545 (1950); Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C.
173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949).
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is merely a reflection of the limitations on legal remedies." It does not
denigrate the importance of protecting a parent's or child's expectation
of society and companionship against tortious interference. 8' There is
ample precedent for allowing recovery for interference with "expecta-
tion interests" of this kind. For example, in a majority of jurisdictions,
spouses who can obtain neither specific relief nor damages against each
other for failure to provide marital society and companionship never-
theless have a cause of action against third-party tortfeasors who in-
directly cause a loss of consortium.2 It is therefore a makeweight argu-
ment to contend that parents and children cannot obtain compensation
from a third-party tortfeasor for damaging the intangible qualities of
the family relationship because they have only a moral obligation to ac-
cord each other society and companionship.
4. Remote and Uncertain Damages
Another objection frequently voiced by courts denying recovery
is that damages for lost society and companionship are too remote and
uncertain to be legally cognizable." While it is true that an action for
lost society and companionship is brought by a "secondary tort victim""
and, in that sense, is "remote," there has been a discernible trend in re-
cent years toward allowing recovery by secondary tort victims, as in
actions for loss of consortium, 65 wrongful death,6 and the indirect in-
fliction of emotional distress to witnesses of an accident. Although a
secondary tort victim is normally permitted to recover for an intangible
8 OThese limitations are alluded to in Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected"
Children, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 987 n.10 (1975).
O1The importance of a parent's psychological support, love, and affection has re-
cently been recognized by a few jurisdictions in other contexts, such as child abuse
reporting legislation and child neglect laws. See, e.g., H. FosTER, A "BILL op RIG=Is" FOR
CHILDREN 11-30 (1974); Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches
to Child Abuse, 12 Am. Calm. L.Q. 103, 107 & n.12 (1974).
02Se notes 18-20 sutPra. In several states, spouses, parents, and children may also
recover for an indirect interference with their expectation of receiving society and com-
panionship under wrongful death legislation. See notes 25, 27-29 supra.
68 Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1975); Hoffman v.
Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502,
295 A.2d 862 (1972) ; Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc. 2d 1078, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1973).
64The term "secondary tort victim" has been defined as a plaintiff who has "no
spatial or legal relationship with the alleged wrongdoer." Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp.
Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216, 219 (1975). See generally Rintala, The
Supreme Court of California r968-69-Foreward, 58 CAL. L. Rlv. 80 (1970).
65See notes 18-20 supra.
66See notes 24-29 supra.
6 7E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See
cases cited in Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 (1968).
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loss only upon proof of a resulting physical injury,"8 or a special rela-
tionship with the primary tort victim,69 surely the parent-child relation-
ship is sufficiently close to ensure the validity of the plaintiff's claim. It
is also true that the action is for "uncertain" damages insofar as com-
pensation is sought for an intangible loss. But many compensable items,
including pain and suffering, 70 emotional distress, "' loss of marital con-
sortium72 and nonpecuniary death damages, s are equally uncertain.
Moreover, most courts permit parents!" (and a few permit chiklren75)
to recover for lost society and companionship when there has been a
direct interference with the family relationship. Damages for an in-
direct interference would be no more uncertain.
5. Practical Problems: Double Recovery and Multiple Suits
Several courts have recognized the sympathetic appeal of the plain-
tiff's plea, but, foreseeing practical difficulties, have declined to engage
in "judicial legislation" to grant relief."8 The two problems of greatest
concern to these courts have been the dangers of double recovery and
multiple suits.
There are actually, two perceived threats of double recoveiy. In an
action by a child, the plaintiff might recover not only for lost society
and companionship, but also for the loss of the parent's support (which is
compensable in the parent's action for personal injuries). 7 In an action
by either a parent or a child, damages for the secondary tort victim's
loss of the intangible benefits of the parent-child relationship might be
indirectly recoverable in the primary tort victim's action for personal
injuries.78 However, jurisdictions recognizing a wife's action for the
68E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). In
actions for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, there must also be evidence that
the plaintiff was near the scene of the accident. See cases collected in Annot., 29 A.L.R3d
1316 (1968).
69in an action for loss of coniortium, the plaintiff is the spouse of the primary
tort victim, and in wrongful death action, the beneficiary is normally the deceased's heir.
70E.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 161 (1961). See generaUy J. STmn, DAwAGEs AND REcovEY §§ 8-29 (1972).71See note 67 supra.
72See notes 18-20 supra.
73See notes 27-29 supa.
74See note 34 supra.75See note 35 supra.
TOE.g., Hankins v. Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189
Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366
(1972).77E.g., Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 59 A.L.R.2d 445 (1957); Russell v. Salem
Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972).78Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962); Russell v. Salem Transp.
Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972).
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loss of her husband's consortium have found ways to solve the double
recovery problem. To preclude the wife from recovering for loss of
her husband's earning capacity, the courts have either recommended
that the jury be carefully instructed on the elements of damage com-
pensable in the wife's action,79 or have required joinder with the
husband's action for personal injuries.80 Similar techniques could be
used in suits for lost society and companionship. In fact, in the two
decisions expressing a willingness to allow recovery, the courts have
required joinder of the parent's suit for lost society and companionship
with the child's action for personal injuries."' Thus, the problem of
double recovery is clearly susceptible to judicial solution.
The spectre of multiple suits against the same defendant is a mat-
ter of concern principally in actions brought by children for loss of
parental society and companionship., While a spouse's action for loss
of consortium adds only one companion claim, "the right here debated
would entail adding as many companion claims as the injured parent
had minor children, each such claim entitled to separate appraisal and
award." 8 This problem could be readily solved, however, by requiring
all of the children in a single family to sue as a class," leaving the ap-
portionment of damages to the judge or jury. 5
6. Increased Insurance Costs
Yet another objection to, the action for lost society and companion-
ship is that it will trigger a substantial increase in insurance costs."6 A
slight increase is to be expected, and presumably will not deter judicial
recognition of the action. But it is impossible to predict the precise
impact of this change on premiums. If compensation should later
prove too costly, the legislature could always put a ceiling on the amount
of damages recoverable,8 7 as the Wisconsin legislature has done in
wrongful death actions for lost society and companionship.8 8 The prin-
7 9See note 205 infra.
8
oSee text accompanying notes 209-13 infra.8 1Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975);
Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
82E.g., Jeune v. Del E. Webb Const. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954); Hoffman
v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962); Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378,
263 N.W. 154 (1935).83 RusseU v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 506, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972).
8 4Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc. 2d 1078, 1083, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696, 702 (Sup. CL 1973).
85See section II[. D. infra.
8 6Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1975); Russell v. Salem
Transp. Co., 65 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972). See also Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury:
The Impact of Insurance, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 219 (1953).
87 Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).8 8 The text of the statute is set out in note 6 supra.
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cipal drawback of such legislation is its inflexibility, but an arbitrary
limit on the amount of damages recoverable seems preferable to no
redress at all.
7. Summary
Courts denying recovery for lost society and companionship have
voiced a number of concerns, including 1) the lack of precedent; 2)
the continuing vitality of the master-servant analogy; 3) the absence
of any legal obligation for a parent or child to accord the other society
and companionship; 4) the "remote" and "uncertain" nature of the
damages; 5) the desirability of allowing the legislature to solve such
practical problems as the danger of "double recovery" and "multiple
suits," and 6) the potential increase in insurance costs. The first three
concerns can most appropriately be categorized as makeweight argu-
ments. The common law is not static, the master-servant analogy is a
relic of the past, and precedents abound for allowing parents and chil-
dren to sue third-party tortfeasors who interfere with their "expecta-
tion" of receiving society and companionship. It is the last three con-
cerns that have troubled the courts most seriously. The question is
whether these problems warrant the denial of relief for lost society
and companionship. The preceding discussion has suggested that they
do not. Although the action would allow recovery of nonpecuniary
damages by a secondary tort victim, the closeness of the parent-child
relationship ought to eliminate any perceived danger of spurious claims.
It should be no more difficult to assess the monetary value of lost society
and companionship than to evaluate any other legally compensable, in-
tangible loss. In fact, damages for the loss of a parent's or child's
society and companionship are already awarded in actions for a direct
interference with the parent-child relationship and in wrongful death
actions. The practical problems inherent in any action by a secondary
tort victim (including the dangers of double recovery and a multiplicity
of suits) can be resolved. And should there be a disproportionate rise in
insurance costs directly attributable to recognition of this new cause
of action, the legislature could limit the total amount of damages re-
coverable for lost society and companionship.
The ultimate question is where to draw the line between liability
and nonliability. Those courts that refuse to recognize a parent's or
child's action know that brothers and sisters, grandparents and grand-
children, as well as aunts, uncles, nieces and nephews are waiting in the
wings. Although the line must be drawn somewhere, there is no
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reason to draw it between an action for lost society and companionship
caused by the tortious infliction of death to a parent or child and an
action for the same type of damage caused by physical injury. Nor need
it be drawn between a spouse's action for loss of consortium and a
parent's or child's action for lost society and companionship. Indeed,
these distinctions are sufficiently irrational that they suggest a possible
violation of the equal protection clause.
B. Equal Protection Considerations
It could be argued that it is a denial of equal protection" for the
legislature or judiciary" to restrict damages for lost society and compan-
ionship to either the parents and children of a deceased tort victim or the
spouse of an injured tort victim. It could then be contended that the
courts should extend the right to recover such damages to the parents
and children of an injured tort victim." Even if a court were unwilling
8 9The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § L Analogous
provisions may be found in most state constitutions. E.g., Fs.A. CoNsr. art. 1, § 2; IDAao
CONST. art. 1, § 2; IOwA CoNST. art. 1, § 6; KAN. CONSr. Bill of Rts. §§ 1-2; N.Y. CoNsI.
art. I, § 11; ORE. CoNsr. art. 1, § 20; PA. CONS?. art. 1, § 1. Such equal protection guarantees
prohibit the creation of a classification that does not bear an adequate relationship to
state objectives purportedly served by the classification. For a general discussion of equal
protection, see Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAraI. L. Rav.
341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rzv. 1065, 1076-
1132 (1969).
Only the denial of equal protection will be considered in this section because it is
probably the most viable constitutional argument. Other state or federal constitutional
provisions could be invoked, however. For example, it could be asserted that a refusal
to recognize the action for lost society and companionship is a denial of due process. See
generally Tribe, Forword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HABv. L. REV. 1 (1973); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HAiv. Civ. RTs.--Civ.
LiB. L. Rv. 269 (1975). Counsel advancing such an argument would contend that the
"liberty" protected by the due process clause is broad enough to encompass the interest
of a parent or child in the other's society and companionship. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (collecting prior
cases recognizing the importance of the family relationship). Consequently, counsel would
assert that a parent or child has a constitutionally protected interest in familial society and
companionship, including a right to compensation for a tortious interference with the
interest, against which must be balanced the state's interest in denying such recovery. The
problem with this argument is that it indirectly requires counsel to take the position that
there is a constitutional right to sue in tort-a proposition which has not yet met with
judicial favor. See note 118 infra.
90 E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Although there are two classifications
under discussion in this section, the judiciary has only drawn the one allowing a spouse
but not a parent or child of an injured person to obtain compensation for lost society
and companionship.
9 1 When a statute violates the equal protection clause because it is underinclusive,
there are two remedial alternatives: "a court may either declare it a nullity and order
that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it
may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion."
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (concurring opinion). On occasion, courts
have expressed reluctance to extend the coverage of a statute for fear of violating the
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to decide the constitutional question, this line of argument might per-
suade it to exercise its common law power to recognize a new cause of
action.02
1. Loss of Deceased's vs. Injured Person's Society and Companionship
Turning first to the legislative classification,93 is it a denial of
equal protection to award damages for lost society and companionship
to persons whose children or parents have been killed, but not to those
whose children or parents have been injured?" The argument has
been advanced in at least three cases from two jurisdictions, 5 but
without success. In California, however, wrongful death damages are
limited to the "pecuniary value" of lost society and companionship.9"
In New Jersey, they are recoverable "solely for pecuniary loss, albeit
that may include services or nurture having pecuniary value, but it
separation of powers doctrine. E.g., Homemakers, Inc. of L.A. v. Division of Indus. Welfare,
509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 803 (1976). But see Hays v. Potlatch
Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972). On other occasions, invoking notions of
federalism, the Supreme Court has declined to determine whether the most appropriate
remedy is the nullification or extension of an underinclusive statute, and has remanded
the case to the state court for a resolution of this issue. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 US
7, 17-18 (1975); accord, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942). However, in
two cases holding that a state statute authorizing the recovery of tort damages was un-
derinclusive, neither the separation of powers doctrine nor federalism disuaded the Supreme
Court from extending rather than nullifying legislation. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968) (wrongful death benefits extended to illegitimate children); Glona v. American
Guar. & fab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful death benefits extended to mother
of illegitimate child). These cases suggest that, in a lost society and companionship action,
if wrongful death or loss of consortium statutes were deemed to be underinclusive, the
courts would probably bd willing to extend the statutory benefits to parents and children.
And if the underinclusive classification were of judicial origin, the courts should be even
more willing to extend the benefits of the challenged judicial decision. The separation
of powers doctrine would not pose a problem, and there is precedent for a federal
court to extend the benefits accorded by an underinclusive state court tort law decision.
E.g., Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974) (extending the right
of married men to recover for loss of consortium under Oklahoma law to married women).92
.E.g., Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967).
93 See notes 24-29 supra & text accompanying.
94 It has been suggested that this is an improper characterization of the classification
drawn by wrongful death acts because such statutes typically allow recovery by all heirs
or persons dependent on the deceased, and not exclusively by parents and children. Russell
v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 507-08, 295 A.2d 862, 865 (1972). However, a statute
that is nondiscriminatory on its face nevertheless may be discriminatory in operation. See,
e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 n.-1
(1956). Moreover, there is nothing to preclude other beneficiaries of wrongful death
damages from challenging the death-injury classification, although they may not be as
successful as parents and children because of the greater societal-constitutional significance
attached to the parent-child relationship. See notes 107-17 infra & text accompanying.
05 Garza v. Kantor, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1976); Suter v.
Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1975); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co.,
61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972).
96 Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d 1, 187 P.2d 752 (1947). See note 26 supra.
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does not include loss of companionship and society as such."' 7 Thus
none of the three cases was an optimal vehicle for raising the equal pro-
tection argument. Counsel would be well-advised to add the equal
protection arrow to plaintiff's quiver only in jurisdictions that explicitly
permit recovery for lost society and companionship in a wrongful death
action."8
Once confronted with this legislative classification, what standard
of review should counsel request a court to apply? None of the cases
considering the question expressly articulated the standard of review
adopted, although the nature of the analysis suggests that all three courts
invoked the lower of the two traditional standards of review." Of
course, counsel for the plaintiff would prefer to have the death-injury
classification strictly scrutinized, 100 but it is doubtful that this standard
would be appropriate.' On the other hand, under the lower standard
of review,"0 2 the classification would probably withstand the challenge,
considering that the reasons for denying recovery set forth in the pre-
ceding section, however unconvincing they may be, would probably be
deemed sufficient to provide a rational basis for the classification. Ac-
cordingly, counsel would be impelled to urge the court to apply an
intermediate standard of review.0 3 Although the existence of an
97 Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 NJ. 502, 508, 295 A.2d 862, 865 (1972).9 8 See notes 27-29 supra & text accompanying.
99 Garza v. Kantor, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1976) (upholding
classification) ; Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 747-48, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112-13
(1975) (same); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 508, 295 A.2d 862, 865 (1972)
(same).
'OoUnder this very rigorous standard of review, a classification will be upheld only
if it is demonstrated that the classification is "necessary" to promote a "compelling"
state interest, and that another, less burdensome classification would not adequately advance
the interest. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1971).
'
0 1 The "death-injury" classification is not basedi on a "suspect criterion," such as
race (McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)), national origin (Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633 (1948)), or alienage (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)). It would
also be difficult to show that it burdens a "fundamental interest" now that the Supreme
Court has defined such an interest as one "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). Although
the Court has recognized a constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy protecting family
relationships, it has not held that this fundamental interest extends to the right to sue
in tort for an interference with a family relationship. See Wright v. Action Vending Co.,
544 P.2d 82, 86-87 (Alas. 1975) (right to sue for loss of consortium is not so "fundamental"
as to require strict scrutiny). See also notes 107-18 infra & text accompanying.
10 2 The lower standard of review simply requires a showing that there is a "rational"
relationship between the classification and the objectives it is designed to advance. E.g.,
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). The classification is presumed to be con-
stitutional, and will be upheld if it is not "wholly irrelevant" to the achievement of any
"conceivable" legitimate state objective. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).0 3 Professor Gunther first advanced the theory that the Supreme Court was applying
an intermediate standard of review when it refused to uphold seven legislative classifications
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intermediate standard remains a subject for debate,'04 this article will
analyze the "death-injury" classification under the Reed test,'0 5 which
has been used as an intermediate standard of review by state courts in
torts cases striking down guest statutes.106
during the 1971 Term without applying the strict scrutiny standard of review. Gunther,
Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. Rlv. 1 (1972). The court has continued to use the equal
protection clause on occasion as an interventionist tool without resorting to strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 125 n.41 (1974).
104Several commentators have written about the emergence of an intermediate
standard of review. See, e.g., Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15
ARz. L. REv. 450 (1973); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal
Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral and Permissive Classifications, 62 Gao. L.J.
1071 (1974). However, the intermediate standard of review identified by the commentators
has never been expressly recognized by the Court. Only Justice Marshall, in dissenting
opinions, has advocated the adoption of a "spectrum of standards .. .that clearly com-
prehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular
classifications, depending . ..on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (dissenting opinion); accord, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970)
(dissenting opinion). For an argument against the recognition of an intermediate standard
of review, see Barrett, Jr., Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications--a More
Modest Role for Equal Protection? 1976 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 89.
0 5 In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (sex discrimination), the Court articulated
what has come to be regarded as an intermediate standard of review: "A classification
'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. .... I"
106 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) was
the first case to strike down a guest statute. After explicitly rejecting the two classic
standards of review, the California court adopted the Reed test and concluded that it
could find no "fair and substantial relation!' between the objectives of protecting hospitality
or preventing collusive lawsuits and the guest statutes distinctions between 1) automobile
guests and paying passengers; 2) automobile guests and other social guests; and 3) auto-
mobile guests exempted from the statute and those subject to the operation of the statute.
In determining the rationality of these legislative classifications, the court evaluated both
the purported objectives of the statute and the means of achieving these objectives
in light of its prior common law decisions. The case has therefore been criticized for
promoting tort policy at the expense of established constitutional principle. Comment,
Judicial Activism in Tort Reform: The Guest Statute Exemplar and a Proposal for
Comparative Negligence, 21 U.CLA.L REv. 1566 (1974); Sidle v. Majors - Ind. - ,
341 N.E.2d 763 (1976); Eleven jurisdictions have refused to follow California's lead,
in Brown upholding their guest statutes against equal protection challenges and generally
applying the lower of the two classic standards of review, as was done in Silver v.
Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929) (upholding Connecticut guest statute). Sidle v. Majors, 536
F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1976) (Indiana law); Beasley v. Bozeman, 294 Ala. 288, 315 So. 2d
570 (1975); White v. Hughes, 257 Ark. 627, 519 S.W.2d 70 (1975), appeal dismissed,
96 S. Ct. 15 (1975); Richardson v. Hansen, 186 Colo. 346, 527 P.2d 536 (1974); Justice
v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974); Furthermore, the California supreme court has
recently taken the position that Brown did not depart from the two traditional equal
protection standards. Schwalbe v. Jones, 16 Cal. 3d 514, 518 n.2, 546 P.2d 1033, 1035
n.2, 128 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 n.2 (1976); Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687
(Iowa 1974); Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165, 226 N.W.2d 121 (1975); Tlsko v.
Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Teax. Civ. App. 1973); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d
883 (Utah 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 810 (1974); Annot., 66 AJL.R.3d 532, §4
(1975). Two of the nine jurisdictions have upheld their guest statutes under the Reed
test. Duerst v. Limbocker, 269 Ore. 252, 525 P.2d 99 (1974); Behrens v. Burke, - S.D.
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Assuming the existence of an intermediate standard of review,
counsel for the plaintiff would have to justify its invocation.10 7 Counsel
could contend that the "death-injury" classification burdens the interest
of a parent or child in receiving compensation for the loss of the other's
society and companionship, and that this interest is closely associated
with the constitutionally protected right to privacy. 08 Several Supreme
Court cases can be cited in support of this position. However, none of
them is directly in point and some of them were decided under the due
process, rather than the equal protection, clause. Thus in Roe v. Wade,1°9
the Court stated that the right to privacy has "some extension to activi-
ties" pertaining to family relationships,110 child rearing and education,"'
marriage,112 and procreation.1 18 In Stanley v. Illinois," 4 the Court noted
that it had "frequently emphasized the importance of the family" and
the "integrity of the family unit."" 5 Accordingly, it held that the
"interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and manage-
ment of his or her children" "undeniably warrants deference and, ab-
-, 229 N.W.2d 86 (1975). But seven highest state courts have followed the California
supreme court by holding that their guest statutes deny equal protection. These decisions
generally apply the Reed standard of review and adhere to the reasoning of Brown v.
Merlo. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213
Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974); Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich.
655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975); Laakonen v. Eighth judicial Dist. Ct., - Nev. -,
538 P.2d 574 (1975); McGeehan v. Bunch, - N.M. -, 540 P.2d 238 (1975); Johnson
v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331
N.E.2d 723 (1975); Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 533, § 5 (1975). These guest statute cases are
important not only because they use the Reed test as an intermediate standard of review,
but also because they illustrate the potential impact of constitutional principles in effecting
tort law reform.
0 7 See Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973), as quoted in note 103 supra.
10 8 The term "right to privacy" is a somewhat misleading, but generally accepted term
of art used to describe a cluster of diverse, constitutionally-protected interests, including
those associated with the parent-child relationship. See Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem. Hosp., 523
F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975). The Constitution of the United States "does not
explicitly mention any right of privacy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
However, the Court has found a "guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy" in
the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,
and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). Several state constitutions now explicitly recognize a right of privacy. See, e.g.,
ALAs. CONSr. art. 1, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
109410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (abortion).
11o Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
111 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
112Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
113Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
114405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (unmarried father's right to hearing on his fitness as




sent a powerful countervailing interest, protection" ' And, in Levy v.
Louisianad7 and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co.,""
the Court stressed the importance of allowing compensation for an in-
direct interference with the parent-child relationship. It applied at least
an intermediate standard of review in ttriking down legislation that
barred the recovery of wrongful death damages by both an illegitimate
child and the parent of an illegitimate child. These Supreme Court
decisions provide some basis for contending that the interest in ob-
taining compensation for the loss of an injured parent's or child's
society and companionship is so closely related to the interests pro-
tected by the right of privacy that the "death-injury" classification
created by wrongful death statutes ought to be subjected to an inter-
mediate standard of review." 9
116 Id. Accord, In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972);
In re Welfare of Myricks, 85 Wash. 2d 252, 533 P.2d 841 (1975).
117391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death action by illegitimate children).
118391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful death action by mother of illegitimate son).
129It might also be suggested that an intermediate standard of review would be
appropriate because the "death-injury" classification burdens the interest in recovering
compensatory tort damages, which could be characterized as an interest closely related
to the fourteenth amendment's guarantee that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 862 n.2, 506 P.2d 212, 216 n.2, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388,
392 n.2 (1973) (summarily rejecting argument that the right to sue in tort is a
"fundamental interest") (holding guest statute unconstitutional on other grounds);
Thompson v. Hagen, 96 Idaho 19, 21 n.12, 523 P.2d 1365, 1367 n.12 (1974) (reserving
the question of whether the right to sue in tort is fundamental) (holding guest statute
unconstitutional on other grounds). This argument might be particularly appealing in
a jurisdiction whose state constitution provides that there shall be a remedy for every
wrong. E.g., FLA. CoNsr. art. I, § 21; ILL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12. Such a constitutional
provision has the advantage of being more specific than the due process clause of the
United States Constitution. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917)
(upholding worker's compensation legislation against a due process challenge); Montgomery
v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975) (upholding no-fault
legislation against a due process challenge). However, even in a jurisdiction with this
type of specific constitutional guarantee of redress, it is unlikely that the court will accord
it great weight. Such provisions have generally been construed solely as a guarantee
that the legislature will not abolish a common law remedy existing at the time the
constitution was adopted. They have not been construed to preclude a modification of
the remedy, provided the modification is an adequate substitute. Compare Lasky v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (upholding Florida's no-fault legislation
"modifying" the common law remedy for personal injuries) with: Kluger v. White, 281
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (striking down Florida's no-fault legislation "abolishing" the
common law remedy for property damage because no-fault coverage for such damage
was not made compulsory). More importantly, they have not been construed as a
mandate to create new causes of action. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144
Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956) (wife denied right to recover for loss of consortium);
Nash v. Baker, 522 P.2d 1335 (Okla. App. 1974) (child denied right to recover for alienation
of parent's affections). For these reasons, it is dubious that such state constitutional pro-
visions would persuade a court to shift from the lower of the two classic standards
of review to an intermediate standard of review in judging the "death-injury" classification
drawn by wrongful death legislation.
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If an intermediate standard of review is appropriate, the next ques-
tion is whether the "death-injury" classification rests "upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation ? ' '12o In the three cases considering the constitutionality of
the classification under the rational basis test, it was held that "the
Legislature could rationally conclude that only on the parent's death
should intangible losses to a child become actionable"'12' because a child is
"totally deprived of parental benefits when the parent is killed but not,
except in unusual cases, when he survives.' ' 2 2 These cases seem to
be premised on the assumption that one of the objectives of wrongful
death legislation is to compensate for lost society and companionship.
However, they apparently conclude that the "death-injury" classification
is reasonable because it guarantees that only those persons with unques-
tionably genuine claims (i.e., those persons who have suffered a total
loss) will be entitled to compensation. This argument might suffice un-
der the lower of the two classic standards of review, 3 but does it
satisfy the Reed test? Or is the "death-injury" classification so restric-
tive in its identification of "genuine claims" that it is fatally underin-
clusive'24 when judged by an intermediate standard of review? Con-
sider, for example, cases in which the injured person is "among the living
dead."' 25 Surely the parents or children of such primary tort victims
have sustained a genuine loss of society and companionship. Further-
more, in other contexts, courts have acknowledged the importance of
safeguarding against compensation for spurious claims, but have held
that this justification for an allegedly discriminatory classification would
not withstand judicial scrutiny under the intermediate standard of re-
view.12 These cases are persuasive authority for invalidating the "death-
injury" classification, despite its purported objective of assuring that only
genuine claims are compensated.
120 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (emphasis added).
121 Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 748, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 113 (1975).
122 Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 508, 295 A.2d 862, 865 (1972); accord,
Garza v. Kantor, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1976).
'2s See note 102 supra.
'
2 4 For an excellent discussion of the concepts of underinclusiveness and overinclusive-
ness with respect to legislative classifications, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAmr. L. Rav. 341, 344-53 (1949).
125E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Erhardt v.
Havens, Inc., 53 Wash. 2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958).
126E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1972) (allowing
recovery of workmen's compensation benefits by illegitimate, dependent children of
deceased worker); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968)
(allowing recovery of wrongful death damages by mother of illegitimate child, despite
fact that "[o]pening the courts to suits of this kind may conceivably be a temptation
to some to assert motherhood fraudulently").
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Another possible basis for justifying the classification would be
the ground that there is a danger of double recovery in cases of injury,
a danger not present in cases of death.'2 There is little merit to this
contention, however. As the courts have noted in actions for loss of
consortium," the primary tort victim recovers for his or her pain and
suffering, whereas the secondary tort victim sues for the loss of the
injured person's society and companionship-a loss that is personal
to the secondary tort victim. Thus there should be no problem of double
recovery in actions for lost society and companionship. To eliminate
the risk of double recovery because of a jury's failure to follow the
judge's instructions, joinder of the two causes of action could be
required." Given the ease with which this risk can be avoided, it is
unlikely that a court applying an intermediate standard of review would
find that it justifies the "death-injury" classification drawn by the
legislature.
2. Loss of Spouse's vs. Parent's or Child's Society and Companionship
The second classification, which has been drawn by both legisla-
tures and courts,13 makes damages for lost society and companionship
recoverable by a spouse, but not by a parent or child of an injured person.
Once again, the interest burdened by the classification is closely related
to the constitutional right to privacy.' 3 ' Accordingly, the application
of an intermediate standard of review could be urged upon a federal
or state court reviewing a legislative classification or a federal court
reviewing a state court classification. 132 If the reviewing court were
scrutinizing its own classification, the following passage from Deems v.
Western Maryland Railway Co. suggests that an intermediate standard
of review might be even more appropriate:
When this court is asked to examine a legal doctrine which it has
laid down in past decisions in light of a constitutional claim not
previously raised, our function is somewhat different than it is when
the constitutionality of a statute is attacked. In the latter situation,
there is the presumption of the validity of the legislative enactment.
127 Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 747, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112 ('1975).
128 E.g., Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 765 (1974); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973).129 See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
13o See note 20 supra.
131 See text accompanying notes 106-17 supra. An intermediate standard of review also
might be appropriate on the theory that the classification burdens the plaintiff's interest
in recovering compensatory tort damages. See note 118 supra.
132 Most of the cases challenging the constitutionality of state court rulings allowing
husbands, but not wives, to recover for loss of consortium were litigated in federal courts.
See cases cited note 136 infra.
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The action reviewed is that of a separate depository of the sovereign
power. When a court must view its own decisions, the action is one
of self-examination." 3
Of course, a court faced with its own classification could avoid deciding
the constitutional question altogether. Nevertheless, it still might rely
upon equal protection considerations to justify the exercise of its com-
mon law power to recognize a new cause of action."
Assuming that the application of an intermediate standard of re-
view is appropriate, does the classification satisfy the Reed test ?... Courts
in several jurisdictions have recognized a wife's action for loss of
consortium, but have denied a parent's or child's action for lost society
and companionship, either in the same case or in one litigated shortly
thereafter.'3 These courts have focused on one principal distinction
between the two actions: In actions by a spouse, damages are recover-
able for sex, society and companionship, whereas in actions by a parent
or child, the sexual component is missing. An analogous "missing com-
ponent" argument was advanced when wives sought to invoke the
equal protection guarantee to establish their right to recover for loss of
consortium. 13 7 Defense counsel contended that the "male-female" clas-
la247 Md. 95, 102, 231 A.2d 514, 518 (1967) (overruled prior decisions holding
that wife could not recover for loss of consortium); accord, Leffer v. Wiley, 15 Ohio App.
2d 67, 239 N.E.2d 235 (1968).
184E.g., Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 106-107, 113, 231 A.2d 514,
520-21, 524 (1967); Millington v. Southeastern Elev. Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 NX..2d
897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968).
23 5 See note 104 supra.
.
3 6 See cases cited note 22 supra. In one of these cases, the court upheld the classification
against an equal protection challenge, apparently applying the lower of the two traditional
standards of review, and holding that minor children are not "situated similarly to the
spouses to whom a cause of action for consortium is accorded." Garza v. Kantor, 54
Cal. App. 3d 1025, 1028, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164, 166 (1976).
187 E.g., Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974) (allowing
recovery; Oklahoma law); Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969) (denying recovery; Indiana law); Karczewski
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (allowing recovery;
Illinois law) (disapproved in Miskunas); Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp.
820 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (allowing recovery; Indiana law) (disapproved in Miskunas);
Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971) (allowing recovery); Berghammer v. Smith,
185 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Iowa 1971) (allowing recovery; Minnesota law; dictum); Leffler
v. Wiley, 15 Ohio App. 2d 67, 239 N.E.2d 235 (1968) (allowing recovery); Umpleby v.
Dorsey, 10 Ohio Misc. 288, 227 N.E.2d 274 (C.P. Stark Co. 1967) (allowing recovery);
Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d 398 (C.P. Paulding Co. 1965) (allowing
recovery); Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974) (allowing recovery);
Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d 166 (1966), cert. denied
386 U.S. 970 (1967) (denying recovery); Seagraves v. Legg, 147 W. Va. 331, 127 S.E.2d
605 (1962) (denying recovery). In all jurisdictions shown above as denying recovery,
wives may now sue for loss of consortium as the result of a statute or more recent judicial
decision. See note 20 supra. For a discussion of the cases cited above, see Clark, The
Wife's Action for Negligent Impairment of Consortium, 54 IowA L. Rav. 510 (1968);
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sification was rational because only husbands could recover for loss
of servces, sex, society, and companionship. 13s Several courts rejected
this contention, holding that both spouses are equally entitled to dam-
ages for loss of the intangible aspects of the marital relationship,"3 9 and
that the husband's right to recover for additional, pecuniary losses did
not justify the classification. It could also be argued that the under-
lying value protected in actions for loss of consortium and lost
society and companionship is the ability of family members to function
normally in relationship to one another. The varying ways in which
familial closeness is expressed are but indicia of this underlying value.
Therefore, spouses, parents and children should be equally entitled to
damages for the loss of familial society and companionship. It ought
to be totally irrelevant that spouses are additionally entitled to recover
for the loss of a partner's sexual capacity.'40
3. Summary
- In conclusion, the success of the equal protection argument will
depend in large measure upon the standard of review adopted. It is
unlikely that a court would apply strict scrutiny. However, assuming
the existence of an intermediate standard of review, its application ap-
pears proper on the ground that the classifications created by actions
for wrongful death or loss of consortium impose a burden on an interest
that is closely related to the constitutionally protected right to privacy-
the interest in receiving compensation for the loss of an injured parent's
or child's society and companionship. If an intermediate standard of
review is applied, a court might invalidate the "death-injury" classifica-
tion. While this classification eliminates the dangers of spurious claims
and double recovery, it is underinclusive and bears no "fair and sub-
stantial relation" to the objective of compensating for lost society and
companionship. Similarly, the distinction between "consortium" and
"society and companionship" might not withstand judicial scrutiny
under an intermediate standard of review. In any event, counsel for
Comment, Duncan v. General Motors Corp.: Equal Protection and the Wife's Right to
Recover for Loss of Consortium, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 830.
188 E.g., Karczewski v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169, 172 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d 398 (C.P. Paulding Co. 1965).
'39E.g., Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835, 838 (10th Cir. 1974);
Karczewski v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169, 179-80 (N.D. I1. 1967); Gates
v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 43-45 (Fla. 1971); Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d
398 (C.P. Paulding Co. 1965).
1 4
o See Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975)




the plaintiff ought not to overlook the equal protection considerations
discussed in this section. Even if not dispositive, when coupled with
the policy considerations set forth in the preceding section, they might
persuade the court to depart from precedent and allow recovery for
lost society and companionship.
III. NATURE AND CONTOURS OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION
Once a court or legislature decides to allow compensation for the
loss of an injured parent's or child's society and companionship, it
must then shape the contours of the cause of action. In fact, some
courts and legislatures may have shied away from giving relief in ap-
pealing cases simply to avoid the real or imaginary problems associated
with this task. However, the following discussion suggests that a more
reasoned response is possible.
A. Nature of the Interest Protected
At the outset, it will be necessary to define the nature of the in-
terest protected by the cause of action. The Wisconsin supreme court
identified the recoverable items of damage as the "aid, comfort, society,
and companionship" of an injured child.141 A California intermediate
appellate court indicated that it would permit a parent to recover for
the "pleasure, society, comfort and companionship" of an injured
child.14' An Iowa statute authorizes a parent to bring an action for
lost "society and companionship"' 43 while the Washington legislature,
in a somewhat more expansive statute, allows damages for "the loss
of love and companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction
of the parent-child relationship.' '1 44 In actions by children, plaintiffs have
requested relief for lost "aid, comfort and companionship"' 45 or "society,
care, protection, support and affection.' 146 In a most comprehensive al-
141 Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 401, 225 N.W.2d 495, 499 (1975). For a dis-
cussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
142 Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 545, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 644
(1975). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
143 IOWA CODE ANN. RuLE Crw. PRo. 8 (Supp. 1974). See also IDAHo CODE ANN. §§ 5-310
to -311 (Supp. 1975), as construed by Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952).
144 WAs. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1975). In Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wash.
2d 91, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971) (wrongful death action), the court construed the Washington
statute as allowing recovery for two separate items of damage: (1) "companionship";
and (2) "loss of love . . . and . . . injury to or destruction of the parent-child
relationship." The latter item was construed as providing recovery for "parental grief,
mental anguish and suffering .... " Id. at 96, 491 P.2d at 1290.
145 Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 504, 295 A.2d 862, 863 (1972) (re-
covery denied).




legation, one child claimed that he had been "deprived... of the family
relationship" and had sustained the "loss of companionship and associa-
tion, the care, attention, kindness, maternal guidance, comfort and solace
of his mother's society."'1 4 7 The common denominator in all these char-
acterizations of the nature of the interest protected is "lost society and
companionship."
While lawyers are often accused of using two words where one
would suffice (a practice not likely to be discontinued in drafting com-
plaints), jury instructions and statutory enactments could be confined
to the use of one or two words which would capture the essence of
the intangible loss sustained. 48 Such restraint might avert any potential
danger that juries would increase the amount of the verdict in direct
proportion to the amount of verbiage used to describe the alleged loss.
The most comprehensive definition of the loss would be "injury to the
parent-child relationship." Terms such as "loss of society and companion-
ship" or "loss of love and companionship," though narrower, would
emphasize the intangible nature of the loss.
B. Persons Entitled to Bring Action
At first glance, the designation of the persons entitled to bring
an action for lost society and companionship might appear to be a
relatively simple task. In the case of an injured child, the parent is
the proper plaintiff; when it is the parent who has been injured, the
child is entitled to recover damages. But what if the injured child
has more than one parent, or if the injured parent has several children?
What if the plaintiff is either an adopted, illegitimate or stepchild, or
the parent of such a child? And should damages be recoverable only
by a minor, or a minor's parents? Or should the right of action ex-
tend into adulthood?
In Shockley v. Prier,149 the injured child's parents filed separate
causes of action in a joint complaint, and in Hair v. County of Mon-
terey,150 the parents joined as plaintiffs in a single cause of action. But
it is unusual for both parents to bring suit for lost society and com-
panionship. More commonly, the father alone sues,' 5' or, in the event
14 7 Hankins v. Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581, 581-82 & n.5 (Iowa 1973).
148 E.g., Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 404, 225 N.W.2d 495, 500 & n.5 (1975)
(recommends use of instruction directing the jury to determine "what sum will reasonably
compensate the plaintiff for the loss of society and companionship" of a child).
149 66 Wis. 2d 394, 395-96, 225 N.W.2d 495, 497 (1975).
11045 Cal. App. 3d 538, 540, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 640 (1975).
151 E.g., Smith v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 171 So. 2d 96 (1965) (recovery denied);
Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972) (recovery denied); Beyer v. Murray,
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of the father's death or desertion, the mother brings the action.'52
This practice is undoubtedly a reflection of the rules governing actions
by a parent for the loss of an injured child's services. In such actions,
the majority of jurisdictions continue to follow the established view that
the right of action for lost services belongs to the father as long as he
has the legal obligation to support the child and is fulfilling that obli-
gation. 153 Only in the event of the father's death or desertion does the
mother have a right to sue for lost services." The theory behind
the majority view is that the parent with the primary obligation of
support is the one entitled to the child's services. 155
In some jurisdictions, however, often in response to legislation
giving both parents equal rights and duties regarding their children,
an action for lost services may be brought by either parent. 5" To avoid
a multiplicity of suits, most of those jurisdictions require joinder of
both parents whenever feasible.' 57 Joinder is unquestionably mandated
33 App. Div. 2d 246, 306 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1970) (recovery denied); White v. City of
New York, 322 N.Y.S.2d 920, 37 App. Div. 2d 603 (1971) (recovery denied).
152 Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery, Inc., 295 N.Y. 270, 67 N.E.2d 155 (1946) (recovery
denied); Foti v. Quittel, 241 N.Y.S.2d 15, 19 App. Div. 2d 635 (1963) (recovery denied);
Quinn v. City of Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 521, 90 A. 353 (1914) (recovery denied); McGarr
v. National & Providence Worsted Mills, 24 R.I. 447, 53 A. 320 (1902) (excellent discussion)
(recovery denied).
153 E.g., Ackeret v. City of Minneapolis, 129 Mlnn. 190, 151 N.W. 976 (1915) (father
not required to join mother in action for loss of child's services); Keller v. City of
St. Louis, 152 Mo. 596, 54 S.W. 438 (1899) (divorced mother with custody of child denied
right to sue for lost services of her son where father was obligated to provide child support);
Whitley v. Hix, 207 Tenn. 683, 343 S.W.2d 851 (1961) (father not required to join
mother in action for loss of child's services); Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex.
1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942) (father was necessary party to action for lost services by
mother and stepfather where neither divorce nor father's failure to support child had
been shown). See generally 1 F. Hiwx_ & F. JAins, supra note 18 at § 8.8, at 630 n.1;
W. PRossER, supra note 3, at § 125, at 890-91; RESTATEmE oF ToRTS § 703, Comment e
(1938).
154 E.g., Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Denney, 190 Ark. 934, 82 S.W.2d 17 (1935)
(mother was proper plaintiff where father deserted and divorce decree awarded her care,
custody and control of child); Martin v. City of Butte, 34 Mont. 281, 86 P. 264 (1906)
(mother's complaint dismissed for failure to allege father's death); Thoreson v.
Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972) (divorced
mother with custody of child was proper plaintiff where father's support payments over
preceding eight years averaged $1 per week).
155 E.g., Keller v. City of St. Louis, 152 Mo. 596, 54 S.W. 438 (1899); Smith v.
Hewett, 235 N.C. 615, 70 S.E.2d 825 (1952); McGarr v. National & Providence Worsted
Mills, 24 R.I. 447, 53 A. 320 (1902).
15E.g., ARaz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-641 (Supp. 1975); IowA CODE ANN. RULE Crv.
PRO. 8 (Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-1 (1972), as construed in Wright v.
Standard Oil Co., 470 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972); N.Y. Doms. REL.. LAw. § 81 (McKinney
Supp. 1975), as construed in Liebler v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 43 App. Div. 2d
898, 351 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1974) (both parents must prove that they in fact contributed to
child's support).
157 E.g, CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 376 (West 1973) (not required if one parent is dead,
cannot be found, or refuses to join); IAHo CODE ANN. § 5-310 (Supp. 1975) (not required
if one parent is dead or has abandoned family); Ky. Rxv. STAT. ANNi. § 405.010 (1972)
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when the parents are married to each other and living together, 15 8 but it
may also be required when they are divorced. 5 ' This requirement
accords with the philosophy that both parents have rights and obliga-
tions regarding the care and support of a minor child. Since both
parents are "equal in the eyes of the law"1 60 (either as a matter of
public policy or pursuant to state'61 or federal 62 constitutional pro-
visions), both parents have an interest in the action for the loss
of their injured child's services. The minority view allowing, either
parent to sue for lost services reflects modern trends in the law govern-
ing women's rights. 6 ' It is also consistent with recent legislation per-
mitting either parent to sue for wrongful death damages.'" Indeed,
it has been held that a wrongful death statute barring a mother's suit
except in the event of the father's death, desertion, or imprisonment
violates the equal protection guarantees of both the state and federal
constitutions.'65
Given these considerations, it can be expected that the minority
view will be adopted by an increasing number of jurisdictions. But
(not required if one parent is dead, has abandoned the child, or has been deprived of its
custody by judicial decree); M. Rlv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 212 (1965) (not required
if one parent refuses to sue); M. Am. CoDE art. 72A, §§ 2-3 (Supp. 1975) (not required
if one parent is dead, has abandoned the child, or been deprived of its custody by
judicial decree); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:1-1 (1960) (not required if one parent is dead, has
abandoned the child, has been deprived of its custody by judicial decree, or refuses to
sue); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1975) (parent bringing suit must serve
notice that the other parent must join within twenty days or be barred from recovery).
&e also Yordan v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1973) (both parents living together
are necessary parties; if one sues, must either file as trustee for other parent or name other
parent as a party defendant); PA. STAT. ANNt. tit. 48, § 91 (1965) (either parent has right
to sue, but must bring action in the name of both as long as both parents are living
together).
158E.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Yordan v. Savage,
279 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1973).
159 E.g., Hunt v. Yeatman, 264 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (not dear whether
separated parents still have "single cause of action") (dictum). In California and Washington,
statutes requiring joinder recognize no exception for parents who are divorced. CAL. Crv.
PRO. CODE § 376 (West 1973); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1975).
16 Oyordon v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 1973).
161 Id.
162 Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 470 F.2d 1280, 1293 (5th Cir. 1972) (notes, without
discussing, alleged violation of federal equal protection clause); Yordon v. Savage, 279 So.
2d 844, 846 (Fla. 1973) (relies on both state and federal equal protection guarantees).163 See generally Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CINN. L. REv. 1 (1975).
164 E.g., ALAsxA STAT. § 09.15.010 (Supp. 1974); IOwA CODE ANN. RurL Crv. PRO. 8
(Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-1-1-8 (Supp. 1975) (joinder required); WAsH. Rav.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1975) (joinder required).
165 Kinslow v. Cook, - Ind. App. - , 333 N.E.2d 819 (1975) (action by both
parents for death of minor son). The court refused to recognize either the danger of double
recovery or the father's primary responsibility to support the child as a rational basis for
upholding the classification based on sex. It then deleted the constitutionally offensive words
from the statute, thereby authorizing suit by either the father or the mother, or by both
of them joined in a single action.
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these are not the only reasons that a similar rule should be applied in
suits for lost society and companionship. It may be plausible to argue
that the right to a child's services is a quid pro quo for the parental
duty to support, and that therefore only the parent with the primary
support obligation should be entitled to sue for lost services. 6 But
no court has yet suggested that there is a comparable nexus between
the right to a child's society and companionship and the parental sup-
port obligation. Absent such a nexus, it would seem that both parents
should be equally entitled to bring an action for the loss of an injured
child's society and companionship," 7 and that joinder should be re-
quired whenever feasible in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits.'
Because many families have more than one child, the danger of a
multiplicity of suits is even greater in actions for the loss of an in-
jured parents's society and companionship.'69 The problem has not
actually surfaced in the reported cases because each of them has been
brought by a guardian ad litem or next friend suing on behalf of all
the minor children of the injured parent in a single complaint. 70 Never-
theless, the problem is a real one.' 7 ' Again, it could be solved by requir-
ing joinder of all children in a single cause of action,1 2 following the
precedent established in those jurisdictions that require joinder of
all persons entitled to recover under wrongful death legislation.'Y
Until now, this discussion has assumed that the claimant would
be a natural parent or a natural child. Presumably there would be no
question as to the right of an adoptive parent or an adopted child to
sue for lost society and companionship. 4 But what if the plaintiff or
166 See RESTATEME.XT OF TORTS § 703, Comment e (1938). But see Kinslow v. Cook, -
Ind. App. -, 333 N.E.2d 819 (1975).
167 E.g., Williams v. Legree, 206 So. 2d 13 (Fla. App. 1968) (mother separated from
father who refused to bring wrongful death action was allowed to bring action for "mental
pain and suffering").
168 See text accompanying notes 156-58 supra. See also Fm-. R. Civ. PRO. 19. For a
discussion of the operation of Rule 19, see 3A J. MooPE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 11 19.05-07.2,
19.19 (2d ed. 1974).
16 9 See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
170E.g., Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962) (recovery denied);
Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc. 2d 1078, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1973) (semble).
171 The problem would be particularly troublesome in actions brought by both minor
and adult children of an injured parent, or by more than one guardian ad litem or next
friend.
17 2 See Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc. 2d 1078, 1083, 348 N.Y.S.2d 606, 702 (1973).
See also FED. R. Civ. PRo. 19.
173 E.g., Watkins v. Nutting, 17 Cal. 2d 490, 110 P.2d 384 (1941); Nelms v. Bright, 299
S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1957); Truesdill v. Roach, 11 Wis. 2d 492, 105 N.W.2d 871 (1960). See
generally S. SPEISER, supra note 24, at § 11.42.
17 4 See Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930) (grandparents who had
adopted child allowed to bring action for child's abduction). See generally H. CLARK, supra
note 3, at §§ 18.1, 18.9; S. SPEISER, supra note 24, at §§ 10.6, 10.11.
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the plaintiff's child were an illegitimate or a stepchild? Several recent
Supreme Court decisions have struck down statutes discriminating
against illegitimate children and their parents under the equal protection
clause.'75 The most pertinent cases are those holding that it is a
denial of equal protection to bar illegitimate children from recovering
wrongful death damages"" or workers' compensation benefits. 7 7 These
cases suggest that there may be a constitutional mandate to allow the
parties to-an illegitimate parent-child relationship to recover for lost
society and companionship.
The same mandate would not necessarily apply in actions by the
parties to a stepparent-stepchild relationship. To date, the courts con-
sidering the constitutional question have distinguished stepchildren from
illegitimate children on the ground that stepchildren do not have a
biological relationship to the stepparent."' On the other hand, it could
be argued that the status of a stepchild is as much "an accident of
birth' a7 as that of an illegitimate child, thereby making the classifica-
tion equally suspect under the equal protection clause. Until the Su-
preme Court resolves the question, the constitutional right of a step-
parent or stepchild to bring an action for lost society and companion-
ship will remain in doubt.'80 Meanwhile, courts and legislatures will
have to determine whether, as a matter of social policy, to expand
17 5 E.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org.
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). Contra Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Matthews v. Lucas, 96 S.Ct. 2755 (1976). See generally Gray
& Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate, 118 U. PENx. L. Rlv. 1 (1969);
Krause, Equal Protection for the illegitimate, 65 MIcE. L. REv. 477 (1967); Wallach &
Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried Mothers and Their Children: An
Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection, and the Uniform Parentage
Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 23 (1974); Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 613 (1971).
In addition to these recent Supreme Court decisions, The Uniform Parentage Act,
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973,
provides: "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every
parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." Usnoam PAR=TAGE AcT § 2. See
generally Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 Fsnr. L.Q. 1 (1974). The Act has been
adopted (with some modifications to sections other than the one quoted above) by at
least one jurisdiction. Ch. 1244, 1975 CAm. LGis. Snav. 3439-3447 (effective Jan. 1, 1976).
176 Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968). See generally S. SpmsER, supra note 24, at §§ 10.4, 10.12.
17 7 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
178 E.g., Dickerson v. Continental Oil Co., 449 F.2d 1209, 1217 (Sth Cir. 1971) (applying
Louisiana law) (stepchild does not qualify as "heir" under wrongful death statute); Steed
v. Imperial Air Lines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1974) (4-3 deci-
sion), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 (1975) (semble).
179 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972) (allowing illegitimate
child to recover worker's compensation benefits).
18 0 Although the Court dismissed the appeal in Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d
115, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1974), appeal dismissed 420 U.S. 916 (1975), such
a summary disposition has no binding precedential impact on the Court in a subsequent case.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 & n.13 (1974).
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the potential class of plaintiffs in an action for lost society and com-
panionship to include not only stepparents and stepchildren, 181 but also
any other parties to an in loco parentis relationship.18 2 A cogent argu-
ment can be made that recovery should be allowed because the loss of
society and companionship will often be as great in this type of situa-
tion as in the case of an injury to a natural parent or child. The prin-
cipal counter argument would be that subjecting the defendant to suit
both by the parties to the in loco parentis relationship and by the natural
parents or children would compound the danger of a multiplicity of
suits. Although a joinder requirement would technically eliminate this
concern,' 8 the courts might understandably prefer to avoid the problems
inherent in attempting to allocate damages equitably between such
plaintiffs once joined.'
The decision in Shockley v. Prier8 5 raises one final question re-
garding the identification of the persons entitled to bring an action for
lost society and companionship. In Shockley, the court "confined" its
opinion (at the plaintiff's request) "to the question of whether such
damages are allowable to a parent during the minority of an injured
child."'* This suggests that a court might limit the persons entitled
to bring suit to minors and their parents. Such -a limitation has in
fact been imposed upon actions for lost services 87 and, in some juris-
dictions, upon wrongful death actions.' 8 But in both types of actions,
181 See Ch. 334, §§ 1-2, 1975 Cal. Legis. Serv. 846-47 (effective Jan. 1, 1976) (allowing
recovery of wrongful death damages by dependent stepchildren and explicitly expressing an
intent to "alter the rule of law enunciated in the decision of the California Court in Steed
v. Imperial Air Lines (1974), 12 Cal. 3d 115."); Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assoc.,
Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972) (dependent stepchildren allowed to recover under federal
maritime law in wrongful death action); Magnuson v. O'Dea, 75 Wash. 574, 135 P. 640
(1913) (stepfather who had supported stepchild was necessary party to natural mother's
action for abduction of the child). See generally S. SPEisER, supra note 24, at §§ 10.8, 10.13;
Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step" Relationship: Cinderella Revisited, 4 FAm. L.Q.
209 (1970).
182 Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Calif., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 720 (1976) (foster parents allowed to amend complaint to allege cause of action for
lost society and companionship). See Peugh v. Oliger, 233 Ark. 281, 345 S.W.2d 610 (1961)
(adult foster child allowed to recover wrongful death damages); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio
St. 299 (1877) (grandfather with custody pursuant to private agreement allowed to bring
action for seduction of child). See generally Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care, S FA. L.Q.
283 (1971).
183 See notes 167 & 171-72 supra & text accompanying.
184 For a discussion of the allocation of damages in an action for lost society and com-
panionship, see section fl.D. infra.
185 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
186 Id. at 396, 225 N.W.2d at 497.
187 Parents are entitled to recover only for the loss of a minor's services. E.g., Fletcher
v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1965); White v. Holding, 217 N.C. 329, 7 S.E.2d 825
(1940); RESTAT- NT OF ToRTs § 703, Comment h (1938).
188 Some of the jurisdictions that limit wrongful death damages to pecuniary losses only
permit parents to recover for the death of a minor. E.g., Mo. STAT. ANN. § 537.080 (Supp.
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the crux of the suit is for a tangible loss (support or services) which
is normally sustained only during a child's minority. In contrast, an
action for lost society and companionship is brought strictly for an
intangible loss that may be sustained irrespective of the age of the
child. Thus, there is no logical reason why adult children and their
parents ought to be precluded from suing for lost society and com-
panionship.189 As a matter of policy, however, some courts and legisla-
tures may want to confine the potential class of plaintiffs to minor child-
ren and their parents.19 This would limit the right to recover to those
persons who are most apt to have sustained a genuine loss. On this
basis, the distinction would perhaps withstand judicial scrutiny under
the equal protection clause, at least if the lower standard of review
were applied. 9
C. Measure of Damages
Because the plaintiff in an action for lost society and companion-
ship has sustained an intangible loss, there can be no precise measure of
damages. Instead, the jury should be instructed to award a sum that
will "reasonably compensate" the plaintiff, for the past and future
loss of the injured person's society and companionship.'92 The jury
should also be instructed to take into account specific factors influenc-
ing the value of the lost society and companionship, such as the per-
sonality, disposition and character of the parent and child, their ages,
the frequency of their interaction, and the intensity of the love and af-
fection evident in the relationship between them.'98 These factors will
be particularly influential when the child is an adult'94 or is not living
1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-20-3 (1954); S. SPEsnR, supra note 24, at § 4.21. Conversely,
adult children are often barred from recovery unless they offer special proof of pecuniary
loss. Id. at § 4.20. See generally J. STnE, DAxAGES AND RcovER § 260 (1972).
18 9 In several jurisdictions, adult children and their parents are allowed recovery for
nonpecuniary losses in wrongful death actions. E.g., Peugh v. Oliger, 233 Ark. 281, 345
S.W.2d 610 (1961) (wrongful death action by adult children, including foster child); Kelley
v. Ohio River. R.R., 58 W. Va. 216, 52 S.E. 520 (1906) (wrongful death action by father
of adult child).
190 E.g, FFA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (4) (Supp. 1975) (parent of a deceased minor may
recover for mental pain and suffering); IOWA CODE AMN. RuL Civ. Po. 8 (Supp. 1974)
(parents may sue for "lost society and companionship" of an injured minor). See also WAsu.
Rav. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1975) (parents may sue for lost love and companionship
of an injured minor or a child on whom either, or both, are dependent for support).
'
9 1 E.g., Barrett v. Charlson, 18 Md. App. 80, 97 & n.10, 305 A.2d 166, 176 & n.10 (1973)
(upholding constitutionality of wrongful death statute allowing only parents of minor
children to recover for nonpecuniary losses). See section IIXB. supra.
'
92 Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 403 & n.5, 225 N.W.2d 495, 500 & n.5 (1975).
193 Id. Similar factors are taken into account in wrongful death actions for the death
of a parent or child. See cases cited note 29 supra.
194 See cases cited note 188 supra.
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with the parent.19 In some jurisdictions, counsel also might be permitttd
to make a "per diem" argument 9 ' to help the jury in assessing the
value of this intangible loss.
Although there is no specific measure of damages for lost society
and companionship, there is a limitation on the period of time for
which such damages are recoverable. The maximum allowable period
should be the shorter of the life expectancies of the parties to the parent-
child relationship. 9 ' In those jurisdictions that decide to allow only
minors and their parents to sue for lost society and companionship, 9 8
the jury should be instructed to award damages for the period of the
child's minority or the parent's life expectancy, whichever is shorter.' 9
D. Allocation of Damages
A far more difficult problem is the allocation of damages among
multiple plaintiffs. Of course, it will not arise if there is only a single
parent or a single child to bring suit for the loss of the injured per-
son's society and companionship. Nor will it arise if there are multiple
potential plaintiffs, but each potential plaintiff brings a separate action.
When the plaintiffs are joined in a single action,209 however, a method
will have to be devised for apportioning damages.
The problem of allocating damages among multiple plaintiffs is
by no means peculiar to an action for lost society and companionship.
195 E.g., Fields v. Riley, 1 Cal. App. 3d 308, 81 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1969) (court upheld
jury's decision to award father no wrongful death damages where mother had obtained
interlocutory divorce decree, father had paid only $62 toward child's support, and father
had rarely visited child); Lewis v. State, 176 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 1965) (mother who
infrequently saw son awarded $1,500; father who lived with son awarded $7,500 in wrong-
ful death action). See generally J. STEIN, DAmAGES AND REcovERY § 255 (1972).
196 E.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 417 P.2d 673, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1966). See
generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., "gm LAW oF ToRTs § 25.10 nn.4-5 (Supp. 1968);
Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958). Although the "per diem" argument has been used only
to assist the jury in awarding damages for pain and suffering, it could also be employed
to assess damages for other types of nonpecuniary losses.
197 E.g., Bond v. United R.R. of S.F., 159 Cal. 270, 282, 113 P. 366, 371 (1911) (recovery
allowed for "expectancy of life common to both the deceased and the beneficiary" in action
for a minor's death); Barrett v. Charlson, 18 Md. App. 80, 305 A.2d 166 (1973) (same);
Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 283 N.C. 395, 196 S.E.2d 789 (1973) (same).
Although the parent would normally have the shorter life expectancy, a child who was
already seriously ill at the time of the injury, for example, might have a shorter life ex-
pectancy than the parent.
198 See text accompanying notes 184-90 supra.
19 9 By analogy, in those jurisdictions that restrict wrongful death damages to pecuniary
losses, some courts have held that the parent of a deceased child is entitled to recover
damages only for the period of the child's minority had the child lived. E.g., Clevenger v.
Kern, 100 Ind. App. 731, 197 N.E. 731 (1935); Frantz v. Gower, 119 Pa. Super. 156, 180
A. 716 (1935). See also Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 509-10 (1950).
20 0 See notes 167 & 171-72 supra & text accompanying.
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It has arisen in other contexts, including wrongful death actions
brought by multiple survivors and actions for lost services brought by
both parents. A survey of these two types of cases reveals that there
are numerous alternative solutions. One is to award a lump sum to the
joint plaintiffs and permit them to divide it as they see fit.2" 1 Such an
arrangement is satisfactory as long as all the parties are on speaking
terms and have an equal voice in the apportionment process. In con-
trary circumstances, however, this method of apportionment does
not offer satisfactory protection.0 2 A better solution might be to allow
the plaintiffs to request a lump sum, but to provide for judicial ap-
portionment of the damages in the event that the plaintiffs do not make
such a request.2"3 The simplest method of apportionment would be on
a pro rata basis. 20 4 More difficult, but perhaps more equitable, would
be an apportionment by the court or jury on a percentage basis in pro-
portion to the value of the society and companionship that each plain-
tiff lost.20 5 This method would create serious problems of proof, since
the loss is an intangible one. It would also tend to destroy harmonious
family relations. However, it would take account of situations in which
one plaintiff is significantly closer to the injured person than another. To
201 E.g., Meissner v. Smith, 94 Idaho 563, 494 P.2d 567 (1972) (plaintiff-parents awarded
lump sum in action for death of their child); Vande Hei v. Vande Hei, 40 Wis. 2d 57, 161
N.W.2d 379 (1968) (plaintiff-parents awarded lump sums for lost services and for lost
society and companionship in action for death of their child).
202 E.g., WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1974) (plaintiff-parents awarded
lump sum in action for injury or death of child unless divorced or separated, in which
case "damages may be awarded to each plaintiff separately, as the court finds just and
equitable").
203 E.g., Onio CODE ANN. § 2125.03 (Supp. 1975) (wrongful death statute providing that,
unless beneficiaries adjust damages among themselves, court shall apportion damages
equitably); S.D. ComprilED LAWS ANN. § 21-5-8 (1967) (same). See also ORE. Rnv. STAT.
§ 30.050 (1974) (wrongful death statute providing that, unless beneficiaries otherwise agree,
probate court will apportion damages for pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses to decedent's
spouse, children and parents).
204 E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1972) (wrongful death statute); Mo. CODE ANN.
§ 537.080(2) (Supp. 1975) (wrongful death statute governing allocation of damages between
parents who bring joint action); Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 470 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972)
(applying Mississippi law) (equal allocation of damages between plaintiff-parents in action
for lost services).
205 E.g., ARiz. Rav. STAT. § 12-612 (c) (Supp. 1975) (wrongful death statute distributing
proceeds to beneficiaries "in proportion to their damages") (apportionment by court); CAL.
CrV. PRO. CODE § 377 (West 1973) (wrongful death statute awarding "such damages.. . as
... may be just") (apportionment by court); Yordon v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844, 847 (Fla.
1973) (action for lost services, society and companionship; apportionment of proceeds "to
one or both parents as may seem just, based upon the social and economic relationships of
the parties to the children") (apportionment by jury or, where waived, by the court);
Liebler v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 43 App. Div. 2d 898, 351 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1974) (action
for lost services; equitable allocation of damages between parents during course of the trial);
ORa. Rav. STAT. § 30.050 (1974) (wrongful death statute apportioning damages to decedent's
spouse, children and parents "in accordance with the beneficiary's loss") (apportionment by
probate court); S.D. ComPInED LAWs ANN. § 21-5-8 (1967) (wrongful death statute appor-
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preserve family harmony without sacrificing the equitable features of
this method of apportionment, it would be possible to provide for a pro
rata allocation among plaintiffs who live together, and a percentage al-
location as to those plaintiffs who are no longer residing under the
same roof. In short, while it may be difficult, it will not be impossible
to solve the problem of allocating damages for lost society and companion-
ship among multiple plaintiffs.
E. Eliminating Double Recovery
Many courts have expressed a fear that recognition of the action
for lost society and companionship would lead to double recovery in
the actions by the injured party and the secondary tort victim. There
are several ways to avert this potential danger. The least drastic measure
would be to instruct the jury that the primary tort victim is entitled to
recover solely for his or her personal injuries, including damages
for pain and suffering, and that the secondary tort victim is entitled to
recover solely for loss of the injured person's society and companion-
ship.208 This type of an instruction would clearly describe and distinguish
the different elements of compensable damage in the two causes of
action. To fetter a potentially capricious jury, the trial judge could
make use of special verdicts or interrogatories, compelling the jury
to designate the amount of damages awarded to the primary and
secondary tort victims.2"" And if the primary and secondary tort victims'
actions were pending simultaneously, they could be consolidated for
purposes of trial.2"' However, the only way to eliminate the danger
tioning damages "in such manner as shall be fair and equitable") (apportionment by court);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636.1 (Slupp. 1974) (wrongful death statute providing that jury "may
direct in what proportion [damages] shall be distributed"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1066 (Supp.
1975) (wrongful death statute providing that "court or jury may award... that amount
of damages to which it considers [each] person entitled").
If the parties settle the case prior to trial, but cannot agree upon an equitable apportion-
ment of damages, the apportionment could be made by a Court. E.g., Omre Rwv. STAT. § 30.040
(1974).
206 E.g., Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 445-46, 304 So. 2d 881, 886
(1974); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 406 & n.23, 525 P.2d 669, 685
& n.23, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 781 & n.23 (1974) (collecting cases from other jurisdictions).
But see Take v. Orth, 395 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. App. 1965) (jury may be instructed to take
into consideration wife's pain and suffering for purposes of determining extent of husband's
loss of consortium).
207 .g., Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 446, 304 So. 2d 881, 887
(1974) (concurring opinion); Thill v. Modem Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 513 & n.8, 170
N.W.2d 865, 869 & n.8 (1969).
208E.g., Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 162, 302 N.E.2d 555, 560-61 (1973);
Millington v. Southeastern Elev. Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 502, 239 N.E.2d 897, 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d
305, 307-08 (1968). See getwra/y FED. R. CIV. PRo. 42.
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of double recovery altogether would be to require joinder of the primary
and secondary tort victims' claims.0 9
The joinder requirement could be made absolute, thereby barring a
secondary tort victim from recovery unless the action for lost society
and companionship were joined with the primary tort victim's action
for personal injuries.21 Such a requirement would preclude any pos-
sibility of double recovery, as the same jury would always assess both
the primary and secondary tort victims' damages. But it has been
termed. "too Draconian"21' because it would bar recovery by a secondary
tort victim who is unable to join the primary tort victim for reasons
beyond his or her control. Such a situation will arise if the primary
tort victim refuses to sue or if the statute of limitations has run on
the primary (but not the secondary) tort victim's claim.2"2
A less drastic alternative would be to require joinder of the primary
and secondary tort victims whenever feasible, putting the burden on
the defendant to request joinder if the secondary tort victim fails to
comply with the requirement.2 -3 This procedure would be advantageous
because it would not bar a meritorious claim solely due to the plaintiff's
inability to join with the primary tort victim's claim. The procedure has
been criticized, however, for placing the burden of requesting joinder
on the wrong party.214
In short, the danger of double recovery can be eliminated with
varying degrees of certainty by means of jury instructions, special ver-
dicts or interrogatories to the jury, consolidation, or joinder. The pro-
209 E.g., Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 404, 225 N.W.2d 495, 501 (1975). See gei-.
erally FED. R. Civ. PRo. 19.
210 E.g., Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Thill v. Modem
Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev.
360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Am., 46 NJ. 82, 215 A.2d 1
(1965).
211 Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 163, 302 N.E.2d 555, 561 n.30 (1973). At
first, Wisconsin had an absolute joinder requirement. Moran v. Quality Alum. Casting Co.,
34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967). Now it requires joinder only when it is feasible.
Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968).
212 Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 580-81, 157 N.W.2d 595, 599r
600 (1968).
213E.g., Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 304 So. 2d 881 (1974);
Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, WS Cal. Rptr. 765
(1974); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971); Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky.
1970); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973); Cline v. Carthage
Crushed Limestone Co., 504 S.V.2d 118 (Mo. 1974); Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc.,
38 Wis. 2d 571, 159 N.W.2d 595 (1968). See genera/ly 3A J. MooRE, FEDEAL PRAcrcC
19.19 at 2585-87 (2d ed. 1974).
2 1 4 Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 548, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 64S
(1975) (concurring opinion).
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cedure selected will depend upon the extent to which the court perceives
the danger of double recovery to be a problem. 15
F. Derivative vs. Independent Action
What must the plaintiff prove in order to establish a prima facie
case for lost society and companionship? And what defenses can be
asserted to defeat (or diminish) the plaintiff's recovery? The answers
to these questions hinge upon the resolution of a broader issue: Is the
action for lost society and companionship a derivative or an independent
cause of action? So far, no court has addressed this issue in the context
of an action for lost society and companionship, but judicial opinions
in actions for the loss of a spouse's consortium and for the loss of a
child's services (analogous actions by secondary tort victims) suggest
that most courts would characterize the action for lost society and com-
panionship as a derivative action.216
With respect to the plaintiff's prima facie case, if the lost society
and companionship action is characterized as "derivative," the secondary
tort victim will have to prove the commission of a tortious act causing
physical harm to the injured person. 217 Regarding the defenses, the
secondary tort victim's action will be barred (or the amount of dam-
ages reduced) by any defenses available against the primary tort victim,
including assumption of risk,1 ' contributory negligence,219 and the
operation of a guest statute,220 workers' compensation statute,22' or
215 See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
2 16 For a general discussion of the nature of a derivative action, see W. PROSSER, supra
note 3, at § 125, at 891-94. Wrongful death actions, which are also brought by secondary
tort victims, will not be cited by way of analogy in this section because the language of the
statute normally determines whether they are derivative or independent. See generally S.
Si'axsER, supra note 24, at §§ 5.1-5.25, 11.5-11.27.
217 E.g., Smith v. Tri-State Culvert Mfg. Co., 126 Ga. App. 508, 191 S.E.2d (1972);
Utecht v. Steinagel, 54 Wis. 2d 507, 196 N.W.2d 674 (1972).
218E.g., Barash v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 315 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1970);
RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 703, Comment a (1938).2 19 E.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Honey, 63 F. 39 (8th Cir. 1894); Nelson v. Busby,
246 Ark. 237, 437 S.W.2d 799 (1969) (comparative negligence); Gayhart v. Schwabe, 80
Idaho 354, 330 P.2d 327 (1958); Brown v. Stertz, 237 Ind. 497, 147 N.E.2d 239 (1958);
Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 186 N.E. 632 (1933); Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N.Y. 422,
122 N.E. 247 (1919); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975) (compar-
ative negligence); Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198 (1925);
RSTATEENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969); RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 703, Comment a (1938); Annot. 21 A.L.R.3d 469 (1968) ; Annot.,42 A.L.R.
717 (1926). It may, of course, be difficult or impossible to establish that an injured child
was contributorily negligent, particularly if the child is very young. E.g., Holmes v. Miss-
ouri Pac. Ry., 207 Mo. 149, 105 S.W. 624 (1907). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3,
at § 65, at 419.
220 E.g., Shiels v. Audette, 19 Conn. 75, 174 A. 323 (1934); Schlitz v. Meyer, 32 Ohio
App. 2d 221, 289 N.E.2d 587 (1971); Arritt v. Fisher, 286 Mich. 419, 282 N.W. 200 (1938);
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statute of limitations."2 If both actions are tried to the same jury, the
jury will not be permitted to return irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts.223
Although a derivative action is thus dependent on the primary tort
victim's claim, it does have certain qualities of separateness and inde-
pendence. For example, the secondary tort victim must prove that he
or she sustained actual harm,224 and the claim is barred (or the recovery
reduced) by his or her assumption of risk225 or contributory neg-
ligence.228 While the defenses to a primary tort victim's action normally
Hall v. Royce, 109 Vt. 99, 192 A. 193 (1937). Contra Irlbeck v. Pomeroy, 210 N.W.2d 831
(Iowa 1973).
221E.g., Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914
(1957); Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alas. 1975); Moran v. Nafi Corp., 370
Mich. 536, 122 N.W.2d 800 (1963). Contra Johnson v. Lohre, 508 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1974);
LaBonte v. National Gypsum Co., 110 N.H. 314, 269 A.2d 634 (1970). See generally 2
A. LAsoN, WORKMN'S COMENSATiON LAw § 66.00-.20 (1975).
It is not yet clear how no-fault legislation will affect suits by secondary tort victims.
Current case law suggests that the courts will not construe no-fault legislation to abolish
such actions, but will allow recovery only if the primary tort victim meets the statutory
threshold requirements. Faulkner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 2030 (Fla. App.
June 16, 1976); Marquez v. Mederos, 307 So. 2d 873 (Fla. App. 1975); Barker v.
Scott, 81 Misc. 2d 414, 365 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
2 2 2 Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1961) (applying Arkansas law); Rex v.
Hutner, 26 N.J. 489, 140 A.2d 753 (1958); Desiourdy v. Mesrobian, 52 R.L 146, 158 A.
719 (1932). Contra Mitchell v. White Motor Co., 58 IL 2d 159, 317 N.E.2d 505 (1974).
See generally Comment, Loss of Consortium: The Applicable Statute of Limitations, 47 VA.
L. REv. 1414 (1961); Annot., 108 A.L.R. 525 (1937).
223When the jury returns a verdict against the primary tort victim, but for the
secondary tort victim, the courts generally order a new trial of both causes of action. E.g.,
Smith v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 171 So. 2d 96 (1965); White v. Hammond, 129 Ga. App.
408, 199 S.E.2d 809 (1973); Bias v. Ausbury, 369 Mich. 378, 120 N.W.2d 233 (1963) (new
trial on issue of damages only); Thompson v. Lannuzi, 403 Pa. 329, 169 A.2d 777 (1961);
Dudley v. Phillips, 218 Tenn. 648, 405 S.W.2d 468 (1966); Norfolk So. Ry. v. Fincham, 213
Va. 122, 189 S.E.2d 380 (1972); Utecht v. Steinagel, 54 Wis. 2d 507, 196 N.W.2d 674 (1972).
When the jury returns a verdict for the primary tort victim, but against the secondary tort
victim, the courts order a new trial of both causes of action unless they can reconcile the
two verdicts, as when only the secondary tort victim was contributorily negligent. E.g.,
Smith v. Tri-State Culvert Mfg. Co., 126 Ga. App. 508, 191 S.E.2d 92 (1972); Hilla v.
Gross, 43 Mich. App. 648, 204 N.W.2d 712 (1972) (when secondary tort victim failed
to prove that she suffered any damage, verdicts not inconsistent); Moore v. Parks, 458
S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1970) (when secondary tort victim was contributorily negligent, verdicts
not inconsistent); Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. 1967). Both the primary and
secondary tort victims must appeal in order to have inconsistent verdicts set aside. McGilvray
v. Powell 700 North, Inc., 86 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1951).
224E.g., Welsh v. Fowler, 124 Ga. App. 369, 183 S.E.2d 574 (1971); Robben v. Peters,
427 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. App. 1968). As a general rule, the secondary tort victim is entitled to
recover compensatory damages only; punitive damages go to the primary tort victim. Annot.,
25 A.L.R-3d 1416 (1969).
225 E.g., Winterstein v. Wilcom, 16 Md. App. 130, 293 A.2d 821 (1972); RESTATEMNT
(Sco=ND)oF TORTS § 694A (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969).
226E.g., Pratt Coal & Iron Co. v. Brawley, 83 Ala. 371, 3 So. 555 (1888); Moore v.
Parks, 458 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1970); Patusco v. Prince Macaroni, Inc., 50 N.J. 365, 235 A.2d
465 (1967) (dictum) (court held that husband's contributory negligence did not bar his
action for wife's medical expenses, but distinguished action for loss of consortium); Marton
v. McCasland, 16 App. Div. 2d 781, 228 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1962); Gustin v. Meadows, 521 P.2d
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bar the secondary tort victim's claim, this is not true with respect to
intrafamily immunities.22 Nor are secondary tort victims affected by
the settlement of the primary tort victim's claim."8 A judgment in the
injured person's case may not operate as res judicata or collateral
estoppel in a subsequent action by the secondary tort victim.229 And
when the two actions are tried before two different juries, inconsistent
verdicts will be upheld.23 0 As a result, some courts have found them-
selves describing a secondary tort victim's action as "derivative, but
independent."2'' This label is probably more accurate, yet it also em-
phasizes the inconsistencies in the law governing actions by secondary
tort victims.
Although most jurisdictions that recognize an action for lost
society and companionship will probably consider it "derivative" and
apply the rules developed in actions for loss of consortium and loss
of services, pioneering courts might want to take this opportunity to
eliminate the inconsistencies in the law. They could characterize the
claim for lost society and companionship as an independent action
based upon an injury to the primary tort victim.2"2 The secondary tort
victim would have to prove the commission of a prima facie tortious act
by the defendant causing harm to the primary tort victim.233 In that
sense, the action would be "dependent." In all other respects, however,
429 (Okla. App. 1974); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975) (compara-
tive negligence); RESTAEE NT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 694A (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969).22 7 For example, it is uniformly held that the parents of an unmarried child may sue
the tortfeasor for loss of services even though their child has subsequently married the
tortfeasor. E.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961); Orr v. Orr, 36
N.J. 236, 176 A.2d 241 (1961); Trotti v. Piacente, 99 R.I. 167, 206 A.2d 462 (1965); Annot.,
91 A.L.R.2d 910 (1963). For a general discussion of intra-family immunities, see W. PnossER,
supra note 3, at § 122.
228E.g., Crouch v. West, 29 Colo. App. 72, 477 P.2d 805 (1970); Kotsiris v. Ling, 451
S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); LaBonte v. National Gypsum Co., 110 N.H. 314, 269 A.2d 634
(1970); REsTATEmENT or TORTS § 703, Comment b (1938).
229 In actions for lost services, the courts have uniformly held that a judgment in the
primary tort victim's case is not res judicata or collateral estoppel in the secondary tort
victim's action. E.g, Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1956); Gumienny v. Hess,
285 Mich. 411, 280 N.W. 809 (1938); Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 144 S.E.2d 27 (1965);
Whitehead v. General Telephone Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10, 49 Ohio Ops. 2d
435 (1969); RESTATENMNT Or TORTS § 703, Comment b (1938). This is also the majority
rule in actions for loss of consortium, although there are a few decisions to the contrary.
Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 933 (1967).
230 See Dudley v. Phillips, 218 Tenn. 648, 405 S.W.2d 468 (1966).
231 E.g., Sove v. Smith, 355 F.2d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1966); Monk v. Ramsey, 223 Tenn.
247, 443 S.W.2d 653 (1969).
232 See Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 293, 195 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1972).
The Wisconsin court later reverted to its original terminology, characterizing the action for
loss of consortium as a "derivative" claim. White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d
442, 449 (1975).2 38 See Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 293, 195 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1972).
[Vol. 51:590
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
'. :Would be "independent." Specifically, the secondary tort victim would
have to prove that he or she sustained actual harm234 and the claim
would be subject to any defenses assertable against him or her, such
as assumption of risk235 or contributory negligence.2 30 However, absent
specific legislation to the contrary, the secondary tort victim would not
be barred by the defenses available against the primary tort victim. Thus
the primary tort victim's assumption of risk and contributory negligence
would not bar the secondary tort victim's recovery.25 7 As under present
234 See note 223 supra & text accompanying.
23 5 See note 224 supra & text accompanying.
2 36 See note 225 supra & text accompanying. If two or more plaintiffs are joined in an
action for lost society and companionship, the contributory fault of one plaintiff should
merely bar or reduce his or her recovery, and should not affect the right of the other plain-
tiffs to recover. E.g., Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 470 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 412
U.S. 938 (1973) (applying Mississippi law) (comparative negligence); Ward v. Buskin, 94
So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1957); Acevedo v. Acosta, 296 So. 2d 526 (Fla. App. 1974) (comparative
negligence); Zach v. Morningstar, 258 Iowa 1365, 142 N.W.2d 440 (1966); Idzojtic v.
Catalucci, 222 Pa. Super. 47, A.2d 464 (1972). Even in community property juris-
dictions, the trend is away from imputing the contributory negligence of one spouse to
the other. Comment, Husband and Wife Are Not One: The Marital Relationship in Tort
Law, 43 U=MK.C. L. REv. 334, 341-46 (1975).
2 37 Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 1974). Handeland is the only case
rejecting the well-established rule that a secondxzny tort victim's claim is barred by a pri-
mary tort victim's contributory negligence. Nevertheless, the general rule has been sub-
jected to devastating criticism. E.g., Ross v. Cuthbert, 293 Ore. 429, 439, 397 P.2d 529, 533
(1964) (dissenting opinion); IF. HARPER & F. JAims, supra note 18 ,at § 8.8, at 632-34,
§ 8.9, at 640; 2F. HARPER & F. JAxeS, JR., TBE LAW OF TORTs § 23.8 (1956) ; W. PRossER,
supra note 3, at § 125, at 892-93; Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife
or Child in an Action for Loss of Services, 2 U. CHa. L. Rv. 173 (1935); James, Imputed
Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. Rv. 340 (1954); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 469, § 3 (1968).
It is difficult to predict whether other jurisdictions will follow Handeland, particularly since
the trend toward comparative negligence has ameliorated the harshness of the rule imputing
the contributory negligence of the primary tort victim to the secondary tort victim. See
cases cited note 218 supra.
The dissenters in Handeland observed that the rule set forth in the majority's opinion
would operate fairly only if the third-party tortfeasor were given contribution rights against
the negligent, primary tort victim. 216 N.W.2d 574, 579-80 (Iowa 1974). Otherwise, the
third-party tortfeasor would pay for the secondary tort victim's entire loss, including that
portion attributable to the primary tort victim's negligence. However, Iowa's "common
liability" and "family immunity" doctrines bar a third-party tortfeasor from bringing an
action for contribution against the primary tort victim. Id. at 579. In other jurisdictions,
the issue remains unresolved. At first glance, it may seem bizarre to say that the primary
tort victim must pay for a portion of the secondary tort victim's loss of the primary tort
victim's society and companionship. Id. at 579-80. See also Plain v. Plain, - Minn.
- , 240 N.W.2d 330 (1976) (husband and children not allowed to recover for either
loss of consortium or society and companionship from wife and mother who negligently
injured herself). However, if the action for lost society and companionship is
truly independent, apportionment of the loss between the third-party tortfeasor
and the negligent, primary tort victim seems reasonable. If contribution is allowed,
however, practical problems will arise. Since the primary and secondary tort victims will
normally be part of a single economic unit, payment of contribution by the primary tort
victim will often have the ultimate effect of diminishing the secondary tort victim's recovery,
unless the primary tort victim is insured. Furthermore, when the primary tort victim is
uninsured, the secondary tort victim may be reluctant to sue the third-party tortfeasor due
to the primary tort victim's vulnerability to a suit for contribution. These practical prob-
lems point to a more philosophical issue: Should a third-party tortfeasor who is a superior
1976]-
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law, judicially-created immunities preventing the primary tort victim
from bringing suit,288 or the settlement of the primary tort victim's
claim,2 9 would not affect the secondary tort victim's action. And such
legislation as guest statutes, 240 workers' compensation statutes,24 ' or
tort claims acts242 would not preclude the secondary tort victim's re-
covery in the absence of a discernible legislative intent.2 41
Even though the action for lost society and companionship would
be "independent," joinder with the primary tort victim's claim should be
required whenever feasible.2 44 Such a requirement would largely elimi-
nate the problems of res judicata and collateral estoppel.245  In the
event of joinder, the return of irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts would
be grounds for a new trial, but verdicts could be reconciled more readily
than under present law, since the defenses assertable against the primary
tort victim would no longer directly affect the secondary tort victim's
claim. 246 To promote joinder, the statute of limitations should be the
same for both the primary and secondary tort victims. One of the
two victims will always be a child, however, and many jurisdictions
have legislation tolling the statute of limitations during minority which
would allow the child to sue after the statute of limitations had run on
the parent's action.247 This roadblock to joinder could be removed only
by the enactment of legislation creating a uniform statute of limitations
for both the primary tort victim's action for personal injuries and
loss bearer be allowed to shift the loss to a primary tort victim when the latter is an
inferior loss bearer? Similar concerns recently prompted the New York Court of Appeals
to hold that the defendant in an action by a child for personal injuries cannot bring a
contribution action against the parents for negligent supervision of the injured child. Holodook
v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).2 3 8 See note 226 supra & text accompanying.
239 See note 227 supra & text accompanying.
240 E.g., Irlbeck v. Pomeroy, 210 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1973).
241 E.g., Johnson v. Lohre, 508 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1974); La Bonte v. National Gypsum
Co., 110 N.H. 314, 269 A.2d 634 (1970).
242 E.g., Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 195 N.W.2d 480 (1972).
24 8 See cases cited notes 219-20 supra.
2 4 4 See notes 212-13 supra & text accompanying.
2 4 5 See note 228 supra & text accompanying. If the two actions are not joined, a con-
vincing argument can be made that collateral estoppel should preclude relitigation of the
issues which the primary and secondary tort victims' claims have in common. E.g., Thill v.
Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969).24 6 See note 222 supra & text accompanying. If the two actions are not joined, incon-
sistent verdicts would be permissible. See note 229 supra & text accompanying.
247 For a listing of the jurisdictions that suspend the statute of limitations during the
period of a child's minority, see 4 Am. JuR. TAmrs 602-03 (1965). Since the tolling is ex-
clusively for the benefit of minors, it does not apply, for example, to a parent's action for
lost services. E.g., Stanczyk v. Keefe, 384 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1967) (applying llinois law);
Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1192 (D.N.J. 1973) (applying New Jersey
law); Walter v. City of Flint, 40 Mich. App. 613, 199 N.W.2d 264 (1972); Paju v. Ricker,
110 N.H. 310, 266 A.2d 836 (1970); Francis v. County of Westchester, 3 App. Div. 2d 850,
161 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1957).
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the secondary tort victim's action for lost society and companionship. 48
Such legislation would of course impose a hardship on minors, but
would be necessary to facilitate joinder.
IV. CONCLUSION
Very few jurisdictions permit recovery by a parent, and no jurisdic-
tion allows recovery by a child for lost society and companionship. Yet
a tortious interference with the parent-child relationship can cause a
genuine loss. Moreover, damages are recoverable for comparable losses
in analogous situations. When a tortfeasor causes the total destruction
of a parent-child relationship, many jurisdictions allow recovery of
wrongful death damages for the loss of the deceased's society and
companionship. And in a majority of jurisdictions, damages are
awarded for a tortious interference with the husband-wife relationship
through an action for loss of consortium. Why, then, have the courts
refused to allow recovery for lost society and companionship?
Several courts have justified their denial of recovery on the grounds
that there is no judicial precedent for the action and no legal obligation
for a parent or child to accord the other society and companionship.
But, since there are numerous instances in which compensation is
awarded for the loss of an intangible, expectation interest, these are
makeweight arguments.
Other courts have been unable to break away from the historical
analogy between the parent-child and the master-servant relationships.
They have held that only a parent (as master) is entitled to sue for a
tortious interference with the parent-child relationship, and that dam-
ages are limited to the loss of the child's services. However, such de-
velopments as the enactment of child labor laws and child support
legislation have diminished the value of a child's services and have
placed increased emphasis on the importance of a child's society and
companionship.
The remaining objections to creating a new cause of action have
superficial appeal, but do not withstand closer analysis. For example,
some courts have expressed concern that damages for lost society and
248 Such legislation could allow a parent to be joined in an action with the minor after
the statute of limitations had run on the parent's cause of action. E.g., Matranga v. West
End Tile Co., 257 Mass. 194, 257 N.E.2d 433 (1970). More likely, however, such legislation
would require the minor to sue within the same period of time as the parent. E.g., Pittman
v. United States, 341 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1965). The Supreme Court has held that the
Constitution "gives to minors no special rights beyond others," and that a state may




companionship would be too remote and uncertain. Yet there is con-
siderable precedent for awarding monetary damages as compensation
for nonpecuniary losses to secondary tort victims. Moreover, the close-
ness of the parent-child relationship would ensure the genuineness of the
claim, even if the action were extended to adopted, illegitimate, step-
or foster children and their parents. Should recognition of the action
trigger an undue increase in insurance costs, the legislature could limit
the amount of damages recoverable. Any dangers of multiple suits or
double recovery could be eliminated by requiring joinder of all potential
plaintiffs, as well as of the primary and secondary tort victim's claims,
whenever feasible. Damages could be awarded to multiple plaintiffs in
a lump sum, unless one or more of them requested judicial apportion-
ment on a pro rata basis or in proportion to the value of the injured
person's society and companionship.
In conclusion, the justifications for denying recovery are not par-
ticularly convincing. If counsel for the plaintiff were to raise an equal
protection challenge, these justifications might not even provide a rea-
sonable basis (under an intermediate standard of review) for the legisla-
tive and judicial classifications that allow damages for lost society
and companionship when a parent or child is killed or when a spouse
is injured, but deny recovery when a parent or child is injured. Given
the fundamental importance of the parent-child relationship, the gen-
uineness of the loss sustained, and the administrative feasibility
of allowing compensation, the courts ought to depart from the
common law prohibition and allow recovery for lost society and com-
panionship.
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